

Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III 12*

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0. Introduction

In *Pramāṇavārttika* I 15–20, Dharmakīrti explains that the theory of essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) is the necessary consequence of correctly understanding Dignāga's words because, without presupposing the notion of the essential connection in Dignāga's theory, inconsistency would be found in some parts of Dignāga's own text. Dharmakīrti, at the very beginning of this portion, says that Dignāga refers to ascertainment (*niścaya*) with regard to all the three characteristics of a logical reason (PVSV 10,28–11,1 = PVin II 93,2–5).

*hetos triṣv api rūpeṣu niścayas tena varṇitaḥ /
asiddhaviparītārthavyabhicārivipakṣataḥ // (PV I 15=PVin II 67)*

na hy asati pratibandhe 'nvayavyatirekaniścayo 'sti / tena tam eva darśayan niścayam āha /

Therefore, with regard to all the three characteristics of a logical reason, ascertainment is spoken of [by Dignāga] as the counter agent (*vipakṣataḥ*) to [those fallacious logical reasons] that is unestablished [in the subject of the thesis] (*asiddha*), that has an opposite object (*viparītārtha*), and that deviates [from what is to be proved] (*vyabhicārin*).

For, if there is no [essential] connection, there is no ascertainment of positive concomitance (*anvaya*) and of negative concomitance (*vyatireka*). Therefore, in order to show exactly this [essential connection], he (Dignāga) mentions the ascertainment.

Here Dharmakīrti tries to identify his own theory with Dignāga's theory of the three characteristics of a logical reason (*trairūpya*). But, where does Dignāga speak of the ascertainment? Dharmakīrti quotes some words from *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III 12bc' and explains that it is understood from them that Dignāga here expresses ascertainment because, due to these words, doubt concerning the presence of the logical reason in similar and dissimilar instances is removed (PVSV 11,3–5 = PVin II 93,6–8):

*dvayor ity ekasiddhapratīṣedhaḥ / prasiddhavacanena sandigdhayoḥ śeṣavadasādhāraṇayoḥ sapakṣavipakṣayor
api /*

[The word] 'for both [disputants]' (*dvayor*) denies [the logical reason whose characteristics are] established [only] by one [of disputants]. The word 'established' (*prasiddha*) [denies the logical reason called] *śeṣavat*

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which is doubtful as to dissimilar instances and [denies the logical reason called] ‘uncommon’ (*asādhāraṇa*) which is doubtful as to both similar and dissimilar instances.¹

These words are from PS III 12bc'.² The Sanskrit reconstruction of PS(V) III 12abc runs as follows:³

atra ca pakṣadharmatvena

nāniṣṭer dūṣaṇam sarvam (12a)

tad yathānyatarāsiddho vā sandigdho vā /

prasiddhas tu dvayor api / sādhanam dūṣaṇam vāsti (12bc)

yas tūbhayor apy apakṣadharmā iti prasiddhaḥ, sa dūṣaṇam – yathā cākṣuṣatvam, sādhanam tu – yathā pratya-yabhedabhedītvam⁴

And here (i.e., in the inference for others), it is not the case that whatever is not accepted as a property of the subject of a thesis is a refutation (*dūṣaṇa*). For example, [a logical reason] which is not established or is doubtful for either [of disputants as a property of the subject of a thesis cannot be a refutation]. However, that which is established [as a property of the subject of a thesis] for both [disputants can] be a valid logical reason (*sādhanā*) or refutation. [To explain:] that which is established as not being a property of the subject of a thesis for both [of them can] be a refutation, like such as visibility. On the other hand, [that which is established as a property of the subject of a thesis] is a valid logical reason, like the difference caused by the difference of its cause.

However, as Steinkellner 1988 has already pointed out, Dharmakīrti's quotation of PS III 12 mentioned above involves some problems:

The first is that in PS III 12b the word *nīścaya* is not actually used, even though the word *prasiddha* might have been regarded as a synonym of *nīścaya* by Dharmakīrti because in NMu 2.4, which has almost the same contents as PS III 12,⁵ the word *nīścita* occurs. Why does Dharmakīrti quote some words from PS III 12, instead of from the passage in the NMu in order to show that Dignāga is speaking of *nīścaya*? Steinkellner 1988 leaves this question unsolved.

¹ See PVSVT 58,21 (= PVT(D28b5–6, P34a5–6)): *śeṣavato 'sapakṣasandehaḥ / asādhāraṇasya tu sapakṣavipakṣayoḥ /*

² Concerning the numbering of PS III, I follow Kitagawa 1965. Both in the footnote of Prof. Gnoli's edition of PVSV and Steinkellner 1988, PS III 12 is numbered as PS III 11.

³ In the Sanskrit text of PS(V), the words which do not have attested Sanskrit fragments are in roman face. My thanks are due to Prof. Shoryu Katsura for providing me his hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text of PS III, which is now under preparation.

⁴ K (Kitagawa 1965: 481–482): 'di yang phyogs kyi chos nyid du / *mi 'dod phyir kun sun 'byin min // dper na gang yang rung ba la ma grub pa'am / the tshom za ba lta bu'o // gnyi ga la yang rab grub pa // sgrub par byed pa'am sun 'byin yin // gang yang phyogs kyi chos ma yin par gnyi ga la rab tu grub pa ni dper na mig gis gzung bya nyid lta bu ste de ni sun 'byin pa yin no // sgrub par byed pa yang dper na rkyen gyi bye brag gis tha snyad pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba lta bu'o //*; V (Kitagawa 1965: 481–482): 'di la'ang phyogs kyi chos nyid du / *mi 'dod thams cad sun 'byin du'ang // 'di lta cig shos su gnyis kar rab tu grub na ni // sun 'byin pa 'am grub pa yin // gang zhig gnyis ka la rab tu grub pa'i phyogs kyi chos ma yin pa ni dper na mig gi gzung bya nyid lta bu ste de ni sun 'byin pa'o // sgrub pa ni dper na rkyen gyi bye brag gis tha dad pa'i phyir zhes bya ba lta bu'o //*

⁵ NMu 2.4 (Katsura 1977: 125): 於当所說因与相違及不定中、[◀]唯有共許決定言詞說名能立或名能破。非互不成猶豫言詞、復待成故[▶]。[◀] ya eva tūbhayānīścītavācī sa sādhanam dūṣaṇam vā nānyataraprasiddhasandigdhavācā punaḥsādhanāpekṣatvāt / (cited in PVSV 153,19–20). For other references to the term *nīścaya/nīścita* in Dignāga's logical works, see Steinkellner 1988: 1429, fn. 9.

The second problem is that the word *prasiddha* in PS III 12b – and also *niścita* in NMu – is, as is understood from the word *dvayoḥ*, used in the context of the inference for others (*parārthānumāna*). According to Steinkellner, this difference of the usage of the word *prasiddha* urges Dharmakīrti to add the word *niścita* to PS II 5cd, which represents Dignāga's theory of *trairūpya*, when he defines a proper logical reason in PVin II 9.⁶ However, Dharmakīrti gives the same explanation for the words *prasiddha* and *dvayoḥ* in the *svārthānumāna* chapter, the second of the PVin, and he even quotes PS III 12bcd' there.⁷ Therefore, it could be said that a notion of opponent (*prativādin*) would be introduced into the inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and it looks improper.

Moreover, there is another problem which is not pointed out by Steinkellner 1988. As is clear from PS III 12abc cited above, Dignāga speaks of the ascertainment (in his own word *prasiddha*) only with regard to the first characteristic, i.e., *pakṣadharmatā*, but not with regard to the other two characteristics, i.e., *anvaya* and *vyatireka*.

The aim of this paper is to examine the reason why Dharmakīrti cites PS III 12 in order to show that essential connection has already been indicated in Dignāga's logical system. To this purpose, I shall first show how Dharmakīrti applies *prasiddha* not only to *pakṣadharmatā*, but also to the other two characteristics of a logical reason. Then, I will consider the role of the notion of an opponent and the problem caused by it. Lastly, I would like to explain why Dharmakīrti does not quote the passage of the NMu, but PS III 12.

1. *asiddhiyojanā*

In PS III, Dignāga discusses the first characteristic of a logical reason, i.e., *pakṣadharmatā*, from v.8 to v.13.⁸ In v.12, which Dharmakīrti takes as evidence for the reference to *niścaya* by Dharmakīrti, Dignāga uses the word *prasiddha* only with regard to *pakṣadharmatā* and even in the following part of PS III he does not use this word in connection with the other two characteristics. So, how is it possible for Dharmakīrti to say in PV I 15 that Dignāga refers to an ascertainment with regard to *all* the three characteristics of a logical reason? Dharmakīrti solves this problem by appealing to the theory found in the NMu.

Dignāga classifies the logical reason, which is established as a property of the subject of a thesis, into nine divisions in accordance with its being present in all, some or no members of the domain of similar instances (*sapakṣa*) and its being present in all, some or no members of the domain of dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*). In his previous logical work, the NMu, Dignāga says again and again that these nine divisions should be accepted by both proponent and opponent respectively in the same way as the first characteristic of a logical reason.⁹ Dharmakīrti calls this theory *asiddhiyojanā* (application of [the same rule as in the case of eliminating] an un-

⁶ Steinkellner 1988: 1436–1438. See PVin II 9: *anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati / niścitanūpalam-bhātmakāryākhyā hetavas trayāḥ //* (PVin II 9ab = PS II 5cd); NB II 5: *trairūpyaṃ punar liṅgasyānumeye sat-tvam eva sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam //*

⁷ PVin II 93,4–5: *tena tam eva darśayan niścayam āha – prasiddhas tu dvayor api sādhanam iti /*

⁸ For a synopsis of PS III see Katsura 2003: 342–347.

⁹ See NMu 2.2 and 2.4 (Katsura 1977, 122–123 and 125–126).

established [logical reason]).¹⁰ The passage of the NMu which explains the rule of *asiddhiyojanā* is as follows (PVSV 13,12–13 = PVin II 96,6–7):

*yāpy asiddhiyojanā tathā sapakṣe sann asann ity evamādiṣv api yathāyogam udāhāryam ity evamādikā ...*¹¹

asiddhiyojanā [is explained] in the following passage [of the NMu]: likewise, [the same rule] should be applied according to the occasion (*yathāyogam*) to [all nine divisions defined in NMu v.2] as in the passage beginning with “present and absent in similar instances.”¹²

However, the following question is raised: because Dignāga says ‘according to the occasion,’ *asiddhiyojanā* is not necessarily applied to all these nine divisions.¹³ Dharmakīrti answers (PVSV 13,17 = PVin II 96,9–10):

na / ya eva tūbhayaniścitavācītyādivacanāt /

It is not correct, because [immediately after the above passage] it is said [by Dignāga in the NMu] that “[with regard to valid, contradictory and inconclusive reasons to which I (Dignāga) will refer later,] only the thing that states the fact ascertained by both [proponent and opponent is called a valid logical reason or a refutation].”¹⁴

Dignāga evidently says that *asiddhiyojanā* must be applied to all nine divisions. In this way, the rule of *asiddhiyojanā* makes it possible for Dharmakīrti to say that Dignāga, in PS III 12, refers to the ascertainment with regard to *all* three characteristics.¹⁵

Next, let us turn to the problem why Dharmakīrti quotes from PS III 12 in the theory of the inference for oneself, since PS III 12 is originally presented in discussing the inference for others.

2. The role of the word *dvayoḥ*

2.1 According to Dharmakīrti, the word *dvayoḥ* is mentioned in order to avoid the use of a logical reason whose three characteristics are accepted by only one of the disputants (*ekasiddhapratīṣedha*),¹⁶ and the word *prasiddha* in order to eliminate doubtful logical reasons. That is, the ascertainment of all the three characteristics should be made by both proponent and opponent and leave no doubt. As I shall show below (2.2), Dharmakīrti rejects the acceptance of an incidental experience or a certain dogmatical view as the basis of this ascertainment. When one

¹⁰ Cf. PVSVT 63,27–28 (=PVT D32a7, P38b5–6) on PVSV 13,12–13: *yathā ca pakṣadharmāniścayena caturvidhasyāsiddhasya vyudāsas tathā ...*

¹¹ NMu 2.4 (Katsura 1977: 125): 於其同品有非有等、亦隨所應當如是說。

¹² NMu v.2 (= PS III 9): *sapakṣe sann asan dvedhā pakṣadharmāḥ punas tridhā / pratyekam asapakṣe 'pi sad-asaddivividhatvataḥ //*

¹³ PVSV13,16–17: *yathāyogavacanāt anivārita eveti cet /*

¹⁴ NMu 2.4 (Katsura 1977: 125): 於當所說因與相違及不定中、唯有共許決定言詞說名能立或名能破。See above footnote 5.

¹⁵ It is to be noted that the same idea seems to be accepted by Kumāri Bhaṭṭa in his *Ślokavārttika*. See ŚV Nirālambana 130cd–131ab: *vipralipsur ivāhaivaṃ kimarthaṃ nyāyavid bhavān // nāśrauṣṭh sādhanatvaṃ kiṃ prasiddhasya dvayor api /*; 148cd: *iti jñātvā ca vo vṛddhair bhāṣitobhayasiddhatā //*; and also Śabdanityatā 344cd–345ab (cited in TS 2317): *asiddhe pakṣadharmatve yathāiva prativādināḥ // na hetur labhyate tadvad anvayavyatirekayoḥ /*.

¹⁶ The same thing is applicable to the word *ubhaya* in the NMu 2.4.

makes the ascertainment of the three characteristics, above all, of the second and third characteristics, i.e., pervasion (*vyāpti*), he should not rely on his own subjective experience or on his own religious or philosophical tradition because such an experience or tradition could cause doubt in the opponent who has never had such an experience or does not belong to the same religious or philosophical tradition. Therefore, for the rational arguments, one must rely on a universally acceptable basis for ascertainment. And this very basis is, according to Dharmakīrti, essential connection.

In this way, by quoting some words from PS III 12, Dharmakīrti derives his theory of essential connection, which is newly propounded by him as universally legitimate basis, from Dignāga's theory. And the word *dvayoḥ* bears great importance for showing the universality of the ascertainment. In addition, the word *dvayoḥ* has considerable consequences for the refutation of other additional characteristics of a logical reason.

2.2 As is well known, Dharmakīrti considers the third characteristic, i.e., negative concomitance (*vyatireka*), as the most important characteristic among the three. If one makes an inference based on the logical reason whose negative concomitance is ascertained by one's own incidental experience, then the conclusion of the inference causes doubt to one's opponent. In fact, real entities may have various qualities depending on their auxiliary causes like existing at particular time, and in a particular place and so on.¹⁷ Therefore, it is likely that the negative concomitance established by incidental experience could be disproved by an opponent or even by the proponent himself when he is in another situation.¹⁸ For example, the taste of the fruits of the *āmalaka*-tree and the effect etc. of some medicinal plants (*oṣadhi*) change according to changes in the environment, such as time, field and the way of cultivation.¹⁹ However, Īśvarasena maintains that negative concomitance is ascertained by mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*) which is propounded as the means for proving non-existence.²⁰ For Dharmakīrti, however, the mere non-perception is merely the fact that one does not see what is to be negated, and it is just an arbitrary or limited experience. Therefore, it does not have universal validity for ascertaining the non-occurrence of a logical reason in dissimilar instances, i.e., negative concomitance.

To this, some adversaries say that even though negative concomitance is once established by mere non-perception, one could avoid making a wrong inference because, when the establishment of negative concomitance is wrong, cancellation (*bādhā*) by perception or some other means of valid cognition will occur.²¹ This theory appears again in the *Hetubindu*, in which it is

¹⁷ See PV I 21ab: *deśādibhedād dṛśyante bhinnā dravyeṣu śaktayaḥ |*.

¹⁸ Cf. PVSV 10,7–8: *kvacit tathā dṛṣṭānām api deśakālasaṃskārabhedanānyathādarśanād |*; PVSV 15,12–13: *kvacid deśe kānicid dravyāṇi kathaṃcid dṛṣṭāni punar anyathānyatra dṛśyante |*.

¹⁹ See PVSV 10,8–9: *yathāmalakyaḥ kṣīrāvasekena madhuraphalā bhavanti |*; PVSV 15,13–16: *yathā kāścid oṣadhayaḥ kṣetraviśeṣe viśiṣṭarasavīryavipākā bhavanti | nānyatra | tathā kālasaṃskārabhedāt | na ca taddeśais tathā dṛṣṭā iti sarvās tattvena tathābhūtāḥ sidhyanti | guṇāntarāṇaṃ kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt |*.

²⁰ See Steinkellner 1966.

²¹ See PVSV 12,19: *pratyakṣabādhāśaṅkāvyabhicāra iti eke |*; PV I 19c: *pramāṇāntarabādhā cen | Śākyabuddhi gives no information about this eke. But according to Dharmottara and Karṇakagomin (PVinT D272b6, P327b4 = PVSVT 61,19), it is Īśvarasena who maintains the theory of cancellation by perception.*

mentioned by an adversary as the fourth characteristic of a logical reason, i.e., the fact that the object (= property to be proven) [of the logical reason] is not cancelled [by means of valid cognition] (*abādhitaviṣayatva*).²² In the PVSV, however, it is not referred to as an additional characteristic, but the idea is almost the same. Dharmakīrti negates this theory as follows: Even if the negative concomitance which is established by mere non-perception has not yet been cancelled, the doubt never disappears as to whether the cancellation of the negative concomitance might occur, and the conclusion of the inference will not be credible (*anāśvāsa*). Therefore, mere non-perception should not be accepted as the basis of negative concomitance.²³ On the contrary, in the case of the logical reason whose negative concomitance is ascertained relying on essential connection, the cancellation never occurs,²⁴ for the ascertainment of the negative concomitance is accepted by both proponent and opponent.

But Dharmakīrti's denial of cancellation causes another problem. In PS(V) III 23b, Dignāga mentioned the theory of antinomic reason (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*)²⁵ and classifies it as one of the inconclusive reasons (*anaikāntika*). If, however, the cancellation never occurs for the logical reason whose negative concomitance is ascertained universally, the antinomic reason should not be mentioned. Since, when two logical reasons whose three characteristics are ascertained are applied to the same subject of inference and lead to mutually incompatible conclusions, these logical reasons are called antinomic. Dharmakīrti's answer to this problem is that Dignāga mentioned the antinomic reason not in the realm of ordinary inference, i.e., the inference which functions by the force of real entity (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*). In the PVSV, the realm of the antinomic reason is not clear.²⁶ However, in his PVI III and NB III he shows that the antinomic reason is mentioned in the realm of the inference which is based on scripture (*āgamāśritānumāna*) the object of which is radically inaccessible (*atyantaparokṣa*).²⁷ As is known from the example for an antinomic reason given by Dignāga, the theory of antinomic reason presupposes particular philosophical or religious tenets.²⁸ The example is as follows: On the one hand, a Vaiśeṣika advocates the impermanence of sound based on the property of being produced (*kṛtakatva*). On the other hand, a Mīmāṃsaka advocates the permanence of sound

²² See HB 29*,2–31*,5.

²³ See PVSV 14,13: *lakṣaṇayukte bādhdhāsambhave tallakṣaṇam eva dūṣitaṃ syād iti sarvatrānāśvāsaḥ* /.

²⁴ See PVSV 14,15: *na / yathokte 'sambhavāt* /

²⁵ *viruddhābhyāṃ hi saṃśayaḥ* / (PS III 23b) *yasmād uktalakṣaṇābhyāṃ viruddhābhyāṃ ekatra saṃśayotpādo dṛṣṭaḥ / tad yathā kṛtakatvaśrāvaṇatvābhyāṃ śabde nityānityatvena saṃśayaḥ* /; K (Kitagawa 1965: 495): '**gal ba dag la the tshom phyir** // gang gi phyir bshad pa'i mtshan nyid can gyi 'gal ba dag gcig la the tshom bskyed pa dag mthong ste / dper na byas pa dang mnyan par bya ba dag las sgra la rtag pa dang mi rtag pa dag nyid la the tshom za ba bzhin no //; V (Kitagawa 1965: 495): '**gal ba dag la the tshom phyir** // gal te gang phyir 'gal ba mtshan nyid gnyis su brjod pa dag las grangs gcig par ni mthong ba nyid de / dper na sgra la byas pa nyid dang / mnyan bya dag la rtag pa dang mi rtag pa nyid du the tshom za ba yin no zhes / (See Kitagawa 1965: 495). In his NBT, Dharmottara interprets the word *viruddhāvyabhicārin* in two ways. See Tillemans 2000: 92, fn. 331.

²⁶ See PVSV 14,17–18: *anumānaviṣaye 'vacanād iṣṭam / viṣayaṃ cāsyā nivedayiṣyāmaḥ* /.

²⁷ See PVI III (D227a4–5, P326a4–5): *de'i phyir dngos po ma mthong ba'i stobs kyis zhugs pa la lung la brten pa'i rjes su dpag pa la brten te de'i don dpyod pa na 'gal* (D: 'ga' P) *ba mi 'khrul pa can sgrub pa'i skyon du bshad de / (= NB III 114: tasmād avastudarśanabalapravṛttam āgamāśrayam anumānam āśritya tadarthavicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa uktaḥ /). NB III 114 is translated in Tillemans 2000: 95, fn. 336.*

²⁸ See Kitagawa 1965: 34.

based on the property of audibility (*śrāvaṇatva*). In this case, the property of audibility is not seen in the dissimilar instances (= impermanent things), but, for the Vaiśeṣika, there is a similar instance, i.e., soundness (*śabdatva*). Therefore, the three characteristics of both the property of being produced and that of audibility are established.²⁹ However, this establishment is admissible only in particular philosophical or religious tenets, and this dogmatic view cannot be accepted as the basis of an ascertainment. Therefore, Dharmakīrti has to exclude the antinomic reason from the realm of ordinary inference. And at the same time, though it is not explicitly mentioned in PVSV, another additional characteristic of a logical reason can be negated. In the HB, an adversary advocates 'being intended to be one' (*vivakṣitaikasamkhyatva*) as the fifth characteristic of a logical reason.³⁰ This characteristic is required only when the occurrence of the antinomic reason is accepted in the realm of ordinary inference. Therefore, this additional characteristic should not be added because the antinomic reason is excluded from the realm of ordinary inference.

In this way, the word *dvayoḥ* serves to criticize the theory that the ascertainment is done on the basis of incidental experience or of a certain dogmatic view, and at the same time serves to negate other characteristics than the three propounded by Dignāga.

3. Problem of introducing the notion of *prativādin* into *svārthānumāna*

As we have seen, the quotation of the passage from PS III 12, especially the word *dvayoḥ*, has great importance for showing the universality of an ascertainment. However, is there any problem in introducing the notion of opponent (*prativādin*) into the inference for oneself? Due to this introduction, it seems that the distinction between the inference for oneself and the inference for others becomes unclear. For Dharmakīrti, however, this is not a problem, or rather, it can be understood as a necessary consequence derived from Dignāga's definitions of the inference for oneself and of the inference for others. Dignāga's definitions of these two kinds of inference are as follows:

PS II 1ab: *anumānaṃ dvidhā svārthaṃ trirūpāl liṅgato 'rthadrk* β¹

PS III 1ab: *parārtham anumānaṃ tu svadrṣṭārthaprakāśanam* β²

Dignāga explains the latter definition as follows:

yathaiva hi svayaṃ trirūpāl liṅgāl liṅgini jñānam utpannaṃ tathā paratra liṅgijñānotpipādayiṣayā trirūpāliṅgākhyānaṃ parārthānumānam β³

²⁹ See Kitagawa 1965: 194 and Tillemans 2000: 92–93.

³⁰ See HB 31*,6–33*,1.

³¹ K = V (See Kitagawa 1965: 447): *rjes dpag rnam gnyis rang don ni / tshul gsum rtags las don mthong ba'o* // PS II 1ab = PVin II 1ab.

³² K (Kitagawa 1965: 470): *gzhan gyi don gyi rjes dpag ni // rang gi mthong don gsal byed yin* //; V (Kitagawa 1965: 470): *gzhan don rjes su dpag pa ni // rang gi mthong don rab gsal byed* // PS III 1ab = PVin III 1ab.

³³ K (Kitagawa 1965: 470): *ji ltar rang la tshul gsum pa'i rtags las rtags can gyi shes pa skyes pa de ltar gzhan la tshul gsum pa'i rtags las rtags can gyi shes bskyed par 'dod nas tshul gsum pa'i rtags brjod pa ni gzhan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste* /; V (Kitagawa 1965: 470): *ji ltar rang gi tshul gsum pa'i rtags las rtags can gyi shes pa skyes pa de bzhin du gzhan la rtags can gyi shes pa bskyed par 'dod nas tshul gsum pa'i rtags brjod pa ni gzhan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste* /

To explain: the inference for others is a [proponent's] statement of the logical mark (*liṅga*) which possesses three characteristics[. And this proponent] wishes to give rise to the knowledge of the marked (*liṅgin*) in [the mind of] the opponent, just in the same manner as [the proponent] himself gives rise to the knowledge of the marked based on the logical mark which possesses the three characteristics.

Dharmakīrti seems to pay close attention to the fact that both kinds of inference are commonly based on the logical mark which possesses the three characteristics (*trirūpalīṅga*). And when someone makes the inference for others, he must use the same logical reason which is used in the inference for oneself. In other words, the inference for oneself is made on the basis of a logical reason which is accepted not only by the proponent, but also by the opponents. Therefore, there is no problem to introduce the notion of opponent into the inference for oneself.

4. Concluding remarks

Dharmakīrti, in PV I 15, shows that the theory of essential connection can be traced to Dignāga's theory, basing himself on the fact that Dignāga speaks of the ascertainment (*niścaya*) with regard to all the three characteristics of a logical reason. According to Dharmakīrti, the passage where Dignāga mentions the ascertainment is PS III 12bc'. In PS III 12bc', however, Dignāga does not use the word *niścaya* but uses the word *prasiddha*; furthermore, the word *prasiddha* is given only with reference to the first characteristic of a logical reason, but not with regard to the other two. Dharmakīrti solves the latter problem with the help of the theory called *asid-dhiyojanā* which is found in the NMu.

Moreover, the passage quoted by Dharmakīrti, especially the word *dvayoḥ*, causes another problem because it implies that the notion of opponent (*prativādin*) is introduced into the inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*), and this is seemingly inappropriate. However, Dharmakīrti gives great importance to the word *dvayoḥ*. If an ascertainment were made by being based on incidental experience or on particular philosophical or religious tenets, it might not be accepted by the opponent on grounds of doubt. Therefore, for ascertainment a universally valid basis is required, and this is the essential connection. In this way, Dharmakīrti derives the theory of essential connection from Dignāga. In addition, the universality of the ascertainment rejects other characteristics added to the three characteristics because these additional characteristics are needed only when the ascertainment is not universally accepted. To introduce the notion of opponent into the discussion of inference for oneself poses no problem for Dharmakīrti.

As has been expressed by Dignāga, in an inference for others, the same logical reason as in the inference for oneself is used. Therefore, the three characteristics, which are commonly shared by the two kinds of inference, should always be accepted by both disputants.

The remaining problem is why Dharmakīrti ventures to quote PS III 12bc'. If he had quoted the passage of the NMu (*ya eva tūbhayaniścītavācī sa sādhanam dūṣaṇam vā ...*), he could have shown more easily and clearly that his theory of essential connection is implied by Dignāga. The hypothesis I can give at the moment is that Dharmakīrti tried to show the consistency of these two works of Dignāga. This attitude is also seen in PV IV 86–88, where Dharmakīrti shows that the definition of the thesis (*pakṣa*) in the NMu is, as far as content is concerned, not different from that of the PS III by comparing the two.³⁴ In the PVSV, on the other hand, he

³⁴ See Tillemans 2000: 117–121.

interprets some words from PS III 12b based on the passage in the NMu. By doing so, he seems to emphasize the uniformity of the two texts and to suggest that Dignāga presupposes the theory of essential connection in both of them.

Abbreviations and literature

HB	<i>Hetubindu</i> : See Steinkellner 1967.
K	PSV translated by Kaṇakavarman and Dad pa'i shes rab, Peking No. 5702.
Katsura 1977	S. Katsura, Inmyō shōrimonron kenkyū [A Study of Nyāyamukha]. Part 1. <i>Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō</i> 37 (1977) 106–126.
Katsura 2003	S. Katsura, Summary of <i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> , Chapter 3. In: <i>Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies</i> . Vol. IX. Ed. Karl H. Potter. Delhi, 342–347.
Kitagawa 1965	H. Kitagawa, <i>Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū</i> , Tokyo 1965.
NB	<i>Nyāyabindu</i> , ed. Dalsukhabhai Malvania. Patna 2nd ed. 1971.
NMu	<i>Nyāyamukha</i> : See Katsura 1977.
PS(V)	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> (<i>vṛtti</i>): See Kitagawa 1965.
PVin II	<i>Pramāṇaviniścaya</i> (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2: ed. Ernst Steinkellner. Beijing/Vienna. 2007.
PVin III	<i>Pramāṇaviniścaya</i> (Dharmakīrti), chapter 3, Tib.: D4268, P5766.
PVinṬ	<i>Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā</i> (Dharmottara), Tib.: D4229, P5227.
PV(SV)	<i>Pramāṇavārttika</i> (<i>svavṛtti</i>), ed. R. Gnoli. Rome 1960.
PVSVṬ	<i>Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā</i> (Kaṇakagomin), ed. R. Sāṅkrtyāyana. Allahabad, 1943 (repr. Kyoto, 1982).
PVṬ	<i>Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā</i> (Śākyabuddhi), Tib.: D4220, P5718.
ŚV	<i>Ślokavārttika</i> , ed. R. Tailanga. Benares, 1889–99.
Steinkellner 1966	E. Steinkellner, Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasena's Lehre vom Grund. <i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens</i> 10 (1966) 73–85.
Steinkellner 1967	E. Steinkellner, <i>Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text</i> . Wien 1967.
Steinkellner 1988	E. Steinkellner, Remarks on <i>niścitagrahaṇa</i> . In: <i>Orientalia Iosephi Tucci Momoriae Dicata</i> , eds. G. Gnoli and L. Lanciotti. Roma 1988, 1427–1444.
Tillemans 2000	T.J.F. Tillemans, <i>Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika: an annotated translation of the fourth chapter (parārthānumāna)</i> , Vol. 1. K. 1–148. Wien 2000.
TS	<i>Tattvasaṃgraha</i> , ed. S. D. Shastri. 2 vols. Varanasi, 1968.
V	PS(V) translated by Vasudarakṣita and Seng rgyal . See Kitagawa 1965.