

Dharmakīrti's  
**Investigation of Relation**  
*(Sambandhaparīkṣā)*  
with  
Devendrabuddhi's  
**Commentary**  
*(Sambandhaparīkṣāvṛtti)*

A trial translation by  
Ernst Steinkellner  
(May 14, 2022)



## Preface

The translation presented here accompanies the edition of Dharmakīrti's *Sambandhaparīkṣā* together with Devendrabuddhi's *Vṛtti*. It was prepared during the process of editing these texts now published as volume 23 of the series "Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region" (Beijing-Vienna 2022: China Tibetology Publishing House - Austrian Academy of Sciences Press).

I gratefully acknowledge the help received from Allison Aitken of Columbia University, who is currently preparing a study of bCom ldan ral gri's commentary on the *Sambandhaparīkṣā*. She took the trouble of carefully going through my translation, and her annotations considerably benefitted me not only by improving the English, but above all through numerous good questions and proposals regarding the translation itself. I truly thank Allison Aitken for this unexpected and inestimable assistance. My gratitude is also due to Yoshimizu Chizuko and her PhD student Gao Ting for improving upon some rather intricate passages in this text. And once more I thank Vincent Eltschinger (E. below) whose expanded and richly annotated elaborate French translation of the text that I could compare will soon be published (cf. Eltschinger forthcoming) and who, after all his help with my edition, offered additional proposals that I take the occasion to add here as well:

SPV xxxvi,8: 14,15-20 : 14,5-20 ed.

13,7: E. proposes °bhāvānapekṣo : °svabhāvānapekṣo Ms

14,5: °āvācyena vā : °āvācyena ed.

14,notes,2: add 5 °āvācyena vā em.(TŚV, T) : °āvācyena Ms

15,9: °opadarśayanty em. E. : °opadarśanty Ms

17,4: E. proposes *katham prasidhyati. naiva.* : *katham, naiva, prasidhyati* Ms

17,9: E. proposes *ato na* : *(y)ato na* Ms

19,4: **vāsau** : **vāsau** ed.

21,9: *bhāvāv abhāvau* E. : *bhāvau 'bhāvau* ed. (change also in note 8f)

27,5: E. reads *etāvanmātratattvārthā etāvanmātrabījāḥ* : *etāvanmātratattvārthāḥ. kim. etāvanmātrabījāḥ* ed.

28,6: *athābhinnaḥ* : *athābhinnas* ed.

28,notes,1: *athābhinnaḥ* : *athābhinnas* ed.

31,1: *vā /* : *vā //* ed.

34,1: E. proposes *tad yogyatāvācyah* : *tadyogyatāvācyah* ed.

35,9: E. proposes *nirantarotpattyāśrayair* or *nirantarotpādyāśrayair* : *nirantarotpattyādyāśrayair* ed.

35,10f: E. reads *na sthiraikasvabhāvānām* : *sasthiraikasvabhāvānām* Ms

45,10: ***ka(tham)*** : *ka(tham)* ed.

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In order to refute relation (*sambandha*) as something real (*vastubhūta*) he says “**dependence**” and so forth.

[v.1] **Relation is dependence (*pāratantrya*), indeed. What dependence is there in an established (entity)? Thus, all entities have no relation in reality (*bhāvataḥ*).**

Relying on another (*parāyattatā*) is **dependence**. This (relying on another) may be given as a relation for a relatum that is established or unestablished. For an unestablished (relatum) there is no real relation since it has a non-existent nature. Also **in an established** relatum **what dependence is there?** None at all. Therefore it is not a relation.

[Objection:] “Even an established (relatum) has some unestablished (aspect).”  
 [Response:] When this (entity with unestablished aspects) is established, dependence is also not suitable because the respective faults accruing from established or unestablished (relata) are not overcome. Moreover, two complete and incomplete natures do not abide in a single (entity). Since in this way there is no dependence for complete (entities) or the other ones, **thus, all entities have no relation in reality (*bhāvataḥ*)**, (i.e.) in fact (*vastutaḥ*). (Relations) created by conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) are (thereby) not negated, because they are no facts.

[v.2] **Relation is a fusion of natures (*rūpaśleṣa*), indeed. But how could this (fusion) come about given that there are two? Therefore (entities) with distinct natures have no relation in reality (*bhāvataḥ*).**

[Objection:] **Relation is a fusion of natures, indeed**, but not a dependence.  
 [Response:] This is not (right). **But given that there are two**, (i.e.) when there is the nature of two relata, **how could this**, (i.e.) the fusion of their natures characterized as identity (*ekātmya*) of natures, **come about**? It certainly could not. Since in case of identity there are no two relata, what were the relation? For this (relation) is based on two (entities).

The following could be (proposed): “Fusion is not that they are of identical nature. It is rather that they are not distant (*nairantarya*).” [Response:] Let that be so! What, then, do you deny? Since not being distant is nothing but the absence of something in-between (*antara*), there would be no real relation. But if not being distant is a relation, why is being distant not (also) accepted as a relation? For in both cases the two relata are not different because they abide by their natures.

Union (*prāpti*)<sup>1</sup> and the like, as well, fall under the meaning of not being distant. Thus, they are not to be maintained.

Since in this way there is no relation even defined as the fusion of natures, **therefore all entities with distinct natures have no relation in reality** other than one that has been superimposed by conceptual construction (*kalpanāsamāropita*).

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<sup>1</sup> The relation defined as “union” or “contact” (*prāpti*) has been refuted in NBh 87,16-88,14 on NSū 2.1.52-54.

[v.3] Relation is the reliance of another (*parāpekṣā*), indeed. As non-existent, how does this (entity) rely? But as existent, how does an entity rely as being indifferent to all (other entities)?

Then “relation is the reliance of another, indeed, not a fusion of natures.” [Response:] In this case, too, when to be related is due to a reliance of another that is relying, the relying one relies either as existent or as non-existent. If as non-existing, **how does this (entity) rely as non-existing?** Reliance would not be the property of an entity that itself does not have a complete nature. What, therefore, would be the relation of what? **But as existent, how does an entity rely as being indifferent to all**, (i.e.) in (its) nature not relying on any (other) natures, so that the relation would be a reliance? The rest (of the argument) is to be dealt with as in the case of dependence (*pāratantrya*).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In the second paragraph on v.1.

[v.4] If there is a relation between two (relata) on account of a relation with a single (entity) (*ekābhisambandha*), what is the relation between this (single one) and the two (relata)? Moreover, an infinite regress (would ensue). In this way there is no notion of a relation.

If, pondering that this (above) refutation may not be allowed to obtain, one assumes a relation between the two, (i.e.) between two relata, on account of a relation with a single (entity) — (i.e.) on account of a relation with a single connection (*saṃyoga*) said to be a quality that is something distinct, or with a property that is not something distinct, or with something inexpressible real, for this reason —, then in the case of the thesis that it is not something distinct, the two relata would be conceived as isolated (*kevala*). Therefore there would be no relation whatsoever. Since moreover, the two related (entities) would be as not distinct from the relation one and the same, because even an inexpressible real entity cannot rightly transgress the alternatives of being either a distinct or a non-distinct entity.

In the case of the thesis that it is a non-distinct entity, there is no relation or anything related. Or else, let the relation be a distinct entity or the alternative. In that case, what is the relation between this (single one) and the two (relata)? (I.e.) what is the relation between the two, the two relata, and this single (relation)? None at all. As there is no relation between the two relata because of the fault explained above, in the same way neither is there a relation between the two relata and this (relation). Otherwise, why object to a relation between the two isolated relata?

Moreover, if one assumes that there is a relation (between two relata) on account of a relation with a single entity (*ekārthasambandha*), then for the relation and the two relata, too, a relation with a single entity must be admitted. Since a relation must be accepted in this way, in this case there would again be a relation with a



single entity. Thus, **an infinite regress** would unfold.<sup>3</sup> But therefore a relation with a single entity is in no case established. When there is no relation **there is no notion of a relation** anywhere **in this way**. The notion of a relation does not attach itself to real entities given that an infinite regress would occur. If one imagines a certain case in which there were a relation without a relation with a single entity, there should be no (such) relation on account of a relation with the single entity also for the (first) two relata. With regard to a relation also between the two isolated (relata) the fault has been already explained. Thereby the conceptual construction of other properties such as not being distant (*nairantarya*) and the like is also rebutted.

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<sup>3</sup> This argument of an infinite regress is also seen in *Tarkabhāṣā* 7,2-6.

[v.5] These two entities, as well as the (entity) other than these, all these abide on their own. Thus, the entities are not mixed themselves. Conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) mixes them.

Since in this way<sup>4</sup>, too, the fancy of a relation is no better, therefore **these two entities**, considered as being related, **as well as the (entity) other than these**, called relation, **all these** as explained **abide on their own**, (i.e.) abide on their own respective own nature. **Thus**, therefore, **the entities are not mixed**, not related, **themselves**, by way of their own nature. [Question:] “Why, then, are they designated as having a relying nature through this or that relation?” [Response:] There is no relation whatsoever in reality. Only **conceptual construction mixes these** entities, although they are not mixed. This (construction), too, arises as it presents (these) as if they had a nature relying on others on account of a certain reason (*nimitta*).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> As proposed in v.4.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. PVSV 34,26f; PV 1.286 with PVSV 151, 26-28.

[v.6] **But by those conforming to precisely this (conceptual construction) words are used that name (verbal) actions (*kriyā*) and their instruments (*kāraṅga*) in order to make a difference between entities known.**

**But by those conforming to precisely this** conceptual construction, (namely) people, **words that name (verbal) actions and their instruments**, (i.e.) that denote actions and their instruments, **are used**, (i.e.) are introduced in the manner of “this (word) expresses an action, this (word) expresses an instrument” **in order to make a difference between entities known**. The difference between entities is the exclusion from others (*anyāpoha*); in order to make this (difference) known. But the relation between actions and their instruments is not real.

[v.7] How is even the relationship between cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) established as one based on two (entities), since these two do not occur together? But if it is not based on two (entities), how is it a relation?

[Opponent:] “Then a relation might be established as the relationship between cause and effect.” [Response:] That is not (tenable), because **how**, (i.e.) not at all, **is even the relationship between cause and effect established** as relation? As what kind of (relation)? **As one based on two (entities)**. Why? **Since these two**, cause and effect, **do not occur together**. That is to say: When the cause (exists), then the effect does not, and at the time of the latter, the cause does not (exist), because cause and effect are not possible at the same time. Also because non-momentary (entities) do not exist, there is neither a relationship between cause and effect nor a co-existence. Thus, also a reference to the doctrine of non-momentary (entities) is not appropriate in this case, because two real, co-existing (entities) could not exist so that a relation would be given which occurs in both (entities). **But if an entity is not based on two (entities), how is it a relation?** Not at all. A relation mentally manifested would be one created by conceptual construction (*vikalpa*).

[v.8] **When an entity (namely relation) successively occurs in one (entity) irrespective of the other, it is not a relation that occurs in the one, because this (entity) would exist also in the absence of that (other).**

That the relation occurs in the cause or the effect successively (*kramēṇa*), is also not appropriate. That is to say: **When an entity occurs even successively in one (entity)**, (i.e.) in one, the cause or the effect, (that entity) called relation would be **irrespective of the other**. While occurring in the cause it would be independent of the effect, and while occurring in the effect it would be independent of the cause. Therefore, as successively occurring in the two it is not a relation between them. What is irrespective of something (and) **occurs in the one**, (i.e.) successively being in the cause or the effect, **is not a relation** of it, **because this would exist also in the absence of that (other)**, (i.e.) because of the reason that the entity called relation would exist even in the mutual absence of the (entities) that are cause or effect.

[v.9] If in dependence on one of the two this (relation) occurs in the other, what it depends on would, indeed, be assisting (*upakārin*). But how does it assist when it does not exist?

May this fault not obtain! If one, therefore, assumes that, because **this** relation occurs subsequently **in the other**, (i.e.) in the effect or the cause, **in dependence on one of the two**, the effect or the cause, by way of requiring (it), (the relation) is certainly based on two, then that which it depends on must be assisting. Why? Because **what it depends on would, indeed, be assisting**, not something else. (Opponent:) “Let what it depends on be assisting!” (Response:) **But how does it assist when it does not exist?** What is called the effect, being non-existent at the time of the cause, (and) what is called cause, being non-existent at the time of the effect, certainly does not assist, due to being incapable.

[v.10] If the relationship between cause and effect of these two (entities) is due to the relation with a single (further) entity (*ekārthābhisambandha*), it would (also) obtain for the right and left horns (of a cow), because they are related with being two and the like.

If the relationship between cause and effect of these two (entities) considered as cause and effect, is due to the relation with a single (further) entity, for this reason, then the relation between cause and effect would also obtain for the right and left horns of a cow because they are related with being two, namely a number, and the like. But (if this) is not accepted,<sup>6</sup> (then) it may also not exist in a case other than this. By the expression “and the like” (is indicated:) because they are related with nearness, farness, hornness and other (general properties).

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<sup>6</sup> V: de ltar mi 'dod na ni; cf. Ṭ 12b1 : de ltar na mi 'dod na zes bya ba.

[v.11] For a relation is something based on two (entities). There is no definition other than this. If the relationship between cause and effect is a junction (*yoga*) with the adventitious characters (*upādhi*) of presence and absence,

[Opponent:] “A relation does not obtain on account of a relation with some single (entity) whatsoever, but with a single one characterized as a relation.” [Response:] That is not (correct). **For a relation is something**, an object (*padārtha*) **based on two (entities)**. **Other than this**, (i.e.) than an entity related to a pair of entities, **no definition of this** relation is possible by means of which its difference from number and so on could be made out.

[Opponent:] Presence when there is presence of something (and) absence when there is (its) absence, these two presences (and) absences of these two present and absent (entities) are adventitious properties, (i.e.) qualifications for some junction, (i.e.) the relation. **If this junction with the adventitious characters of presence and absence is the relationship between cause and effect**, (but) not every relation,



[v.12] **why are not in this case just these two adventitious characters of the junction the relationship between cause and effect? If (this is) because (these) are different, does this term (*śabda*) not rely on the user?**

[Response:] **why are not in this case just these two adventitious characters of the junction, (i.e.) presence and absence, the relationship between cause and effect, so that a relation is imagined that does not exist and has no advantage?**

If (the opponent assumes that) **(this is) because (these) are different** (entities), the following could be meant: “Presence when (something) is present (and) absence when (it) is absent” are multiple referents of expression, but as articulated by a term that expresses a single entity, (namely) “the relation between cause and effect”, it is inappropriate that they are the referent of this (term). Therefore, we do not assume that presence and absence are the relationship between cause and effect. (Response:) **Does this term not rely on the user, a person?** Since it relies on the user, how he uses some word, so it expresses it. Thus, there is surely no objection to a single term also for multiple (referents).

**[v.13] When seeing one (thing), something not seen (before) is seen, (and) is not seen when that (former) is not seen, a person deduces an effect even without people instructing (him).**

Therefore precisely these two, presence and absence, are appropriate as the relationship between cause and effect. For, **when seeing one (thing)**, assumed to be the cause, **something not seen (before)** that is visible as such, called the effect, **is seen**, (i.e.) seeing which he saw it, **(and) is not seen when that (former) is not seen** which he assumes to be the effect, **a person deduces an effect**, (i.e.) understands that this comes about because of that, **even without people instructing (him)**, (i.e.) the person (understands) without an instructor that this comes about because of that.

Also (the proposition) that one deduces (this notion) on account of a convention (*sañketa*) is idle. That is to say: Even in the case of a convention nothing other is known than presence and absence. Therefore, that which is known upon the apprehension of something is the content of that (apprehension), just like whiteness, because white is apprehended upon the apprehension of a white cloth. And when one comes to apprehend presence and absence, one apprehends the relationship between cause and effect. Thus, presence and absence are the content of the apprehension of the relationship between cause and effect, nothing else.

The following might be (proposed): Presence and absence are the means for establishing (*sādhana*), the relationship between cause and effect to be established (*sādhya*) is something else. [Response:] If it is something else, why is its nature not stated? [Opponent:] Then, (its) nature is the relationship between the generating and the generated. [Response:] Is the difference of things, then, due to another name, so that it is thus communicated? That is to say: (Expressions) such as the relationship between generating and generated, the relationship between producing and produced, the relationship between cause and effect, and the like are synonyms.

[v.14] Since without seeing and not seeing the notion of an effect does not come about, even words such as “effect” are introduced for these for the sake of ease.

Therefore, since **except for seeing and not seeing** presence and absence **the notion of an effect does not come about**, because the object is indicated by what refers to the object, for this reason, **even words such as “effect” are introduced for these**, (i.e.) for presence and absence, **for the sake of ease** in verbal usage with the intention that people not express such a string of verbiage for every word.

[v.15] **Whatever notion of effect of that (entity) is described on account of the presence when that is present, is called the object of a convention, like the notion “cow” on account of a dewlap and so forth.**

[Opponent:] (You say:) The relation between cause and effect is nothing other than common presence and common absence. If it is nothing other (than that), how is that (notion) established through presence and absence? [Response:] **The notion of effect of that (entity) on account of the presence when that is present**, for this logical reason, (i.e.) the notion of effect of that which is present when that is present, **whatever is described** (in the form) “this is the effect and (this is) the cause of that,” **is called the object of a convention.** That description as the coming about when that is present is conveying the object of the convention of cause and effect, not a different object. Like what? It is **like the notion “cow” on account of a dewlap and so forth**, (i.e.) like by (saying) “This is a cow, because it has a dewlap and so forth,” the object of the usage of (the word) “cow” is indicated.

[v.16] <sup>α</sup>The presence of that (entity) when an entity is to come about, and the fact of coming about only when (it) is present, are commonly accepted through perceptions and non-perceptions as the (characters of) being a cause and being an effect.<sup>α</sup>

<sup>α-α</sup> cf. PVSV 19,6-8 (PVSVT 97,29f)

The following might be (proposed): “If presence and absence are the (characters of) being a cause and an effect, then simple being a cause and being an effect depended on presence and absence given in both. Otherwise, how would mere presence be a cause or an effect? But the (characters of) being an effect or being a cause are not given in both the presence of a present and the absence of an absent (entity). The relationship between cause and effect would, nevertheless, obtain.”

[Response:] That is not (correct). Even if (they) are given in both, the presence and absence of the prior (entity) which qualify the presence and absence of the subsequent (entity) are the (character of) being the cause, (and) the presence and absence of the subsequent (entity) which qualify the presence and absence of the prior (entity) are the (character of) being the effect. That is to say: **When an entity is to come about**, (i.e.) in case of an entity that has the property of becoming, **the presence of that (entity)**, (i.e.) the presence of what is held to be the cause. The restriction “**only when (it) is present**” holds also in this case. Thereby (also) the common absence is hinted at. **And the fact of coming about** of what is held as the effect **only when (it) is present**, (i.e.) of what is held as the cause, is the (character of) being the effect. Thus, they are **generally accepted through perceptions and non-perceptions as the (characters of) being a cause and being an effect**. For such reason only presence and absence are the characters of being a cause and of being an effect, nothing else.

[v.17] **With an object that is real merely to this extent conceptions that refer to cause and effect, with false objects present entities as if (they were) joined.**

Therefore (conceptions) **with an object that is real merely to this extent.** (The compound analysed:) Merely to this extent, (namely as consisting in) presence and absence. Of which object only these two (presence and absence) are the real true state, that (object) is real merely to this extent. To which conceptions this object belongs, these have an object that is real merely to this extent. Why? **They refer to cause and effect** with seeds merely to this extent. These (conceptions) **present unrelated entities as if (they were) joined,** (i.e.) as if they were related. But because of the joining in this manner (these conceptions) are **with false objects.**

[v.18] What joining (*ghaṭanā*) is there in case of separate (entities)? Also what relationship between cause and effect is there in case of non-separate (entities)? But if yet another (entity) were present, how would the two unfused (entities) be fused?

[Question:] Why is an unreal relation exhibited through these (conceptions), such that they bear false objects? [Response:] It is so! That is to say, in this case there are two options: When something is related as a cause or an effect, it would either be separate or non-separate (from the other relatum). If it is separate, then **what joining is there in case of separate (entities)?** None at all, because they abide in their own nature. But if it is non-separate, **also what relationship between cause and effect is there in the case of non-separate (entities)?** None at all, because that which is unaccomplished, yet to be produced and distinct from its cause does not exist. How is there, once again, a joining of these two?

The following might be (proposed): “There is no relation for separate or non-separate (entities) isolated, but there is on account of the relation with a single one called ‘relation’.” [Response:] In this case too, **if yet another (entity) called relation were present, (i.e.) existed, how would the two unfused (entities) thought to be effect or cause be fused?** Not at all. Precisely this (entity) called ‘relation’ would be something else. In case of the presence of this (relation) there would, nevertheless, be no mixing of the nature for whatever other (entity). Thus, where would a relation in reality come from?

[v.19] What is connected (*saṃyogin*), what is inherent (*samavāyin*) and the like, all this is thereby taken into consideration, both because there is neither a mutual assistance nor is anything of this kind related.

**What is connected, what is inherent and the like.** By the expression “**and the like**” (the relations of) master and servant (*svasvāmin*) and so forth (are included). **All this is thereby**, (i.e.) by the preceding treatise that refutes relations in general, **taken into consideration** in the sense that there is factually no relation characterized as connection (*saṃyoga*) and the like.

To begin with, an inherent (entity) (*samavāyin*), such as whiteness, a quality, inherent in a cloth, is not related, **because there is** neither any **mutual**, reciprocal, **assistance** between these two, (i.e.) because there is no relationship between producer and produced, for this reason, **nor is anything of this kind** characterized as inherent, (i.e.) as neither assisted nor assisting, **related**. That is to say: What is to be assisted (*kārya*) by something this depends on that, and what depends on it has a relation with it. But white and cloth are not of this kind, because they are accomplished in their own natures.

Neither does a relationship of support and supported (*ādhārādheyabhāva*) obtain for (entities) that are not effect and cause, and in the case of the relationship between cause and effect, there is the fault accruing in this case. If there is a relationship between cause and effect, the assumption of a relation between white and cloth is also not proper, because of a relationship between support and supported. That is to say: There is no commonly accepted relationship between these two (white and cloth) as support and supported. But when the relationship between support and supported is characterized as one between produced and producer, a relation defined as inherence would not obtain between the two that are a universal and what possesses it, which are neither mutually assisted nor assisting.



[v.20] For, even if an effect were produced through a certain inherent (entity), then this (entity) is not something inherent. It were not (inherent) because of that (producing), due to an undesired consequence.

The following might be (proposed): “There is a certain inherent (entity) which produces something in the form of a whole (*avayavin*) called the effect. Therefore it is not unrelated because it does not assist.” [Response:] **For, even if** it is assumed that **an effect were produced** in this way **through a certain inherent (entity), this (entity) is, then, not something inherent**, because what is to be produced is not (yet) completed at the time of production since there is no co-occurrence of the two, because the cause has disappeared when the effect is completed, and because if it has not disappeared, there is no relationship of assisted and assisting between the two co-occurring (entities). Or let something be inherent! **It were, however, not (inherent) because of that**, (i.e.) because of producing, for this reason. **Why? Due to an undesired consequence:** because also a potter and so on would become related since they produce the pot.

[v.21] If there were a relation, although these two (entities) do not assist in regard to an inherence or to another (entity), everything would be mutually inherent.

So that this fault may not obtain, if, although these two inherent (entities) do not assist one another, and the two relata do not assist in regard to an inherence, because this is permanent, and, although these two do not assist an inherence or another (entity) anywhere, you (still) accept a relation, then everything, the entire mutually unrelated world, would be mutually inherent. But this is not so. Therefore, there is no inherence in this way in the case of the thesis of assisting or non-assisting. But another mode is not possible. Thereby also two connected (entities) (*saṃyogin*) are refuted.

[v.22] Even if they produce a connection (*saṃyoga*), these two are not for this reason accepted as being connected, because (then) motion (*karman*) and so on would (also) be connected. An abiding (*sthiti*), however, has been explained in detail.

Moreover, since connection is an effect, when these two are connected because this (connection) is produced by these two, then **even if they produce a connection** in this way, **these two are not for this reason accepted as being connected**, (i.e.) because they produce the connection, for this reason. Why? **Because (then) motion and so on would (also) be connected**. If something is connected because it produces a connection, also motion would be connected. That is to say: Connection is held to arise through the motion of one of two (entities) (or) to arise through the motion of both. Through the expression “**and so on**” (it is implied that) also connection would be connected in the sense of “because this (connection) is assumed also to arise from a connection.”

[Objection:] “It is not the case that there is a connection because (these two entities) produce a connection, but rather because they cause an abiding.”

[Response:] This is not the case. **An abiding, however, has been explained in detail**, (i.e.) in the *Pramāṇavārttika*<sup>7</sup> it has been rejected, when it says that there is no abiding other than the relationship between produced and producer for two (entities) that are abiding and causing to abide.

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. PV 1.145 with PVSV 71,11-72,10, where Dharmakīrti, through his refutation of the opinion that particular entities are the basis of universals (*sāmānya*) because they cause their abiding (*sthiti*) in them, not because they produce them, also refutes the inherence of universals (*sāmānya*) in entities that words refer to. Cf. Frauwallner 1933: 69-71 (= 1982: 424-426).

[v.23] **This unsuitable (entity) becomes suitable (*yogya*) for a basis of connection and so on, because for (an entity) with a nature that is permanently suitable, the lack of this (suitability) is incompatible.**<sup>8</sup>

[Opponent:] “If the notion of connection and so on were given without a (real) connection and so on, then the nature of two separate (entities) would be also given for two connected (entities); likewise, the nature of two connected (entities) would be given for two separate (entities), as well as of abiding and non-abiding ones. Why, therefore, is there no notion of connection and so on (in all these cases)? But this is not so. Thus, connection, separation, and motion are the cause of the notion of connection and so on.” [Response:] (That is) not (correct), because of the same critique. For, why is there no inherence of connection and so on for separate (entities) and so on that have the same nature also for you?

[Opponent:] “There is no connection and separation because a motion that produces them does not exist.” [Response:] If this is so, why is it not the case that motion and its causes also (do not exist)? Thus, this is hard to answer. Therefore, you have to state precisely the following: **This (entity) with a separate and so on nature, being *unsuitable* earlier, becomes *suitable* later for a basis of connection and so on.** Why? Because **for (an entity) with a nature that is permanently suitable** for engaging in connection and so on, **the lack of this (suitability) is incompatible**, (i.e.) the lack of engaging in connection and so on is incompatible. We, too, have to state the same, (a real) connection and so on excepted.

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<sup>8</sup> With the concept of suitability (*yogyatā*) possibly Bhartṛhari’s conception for the relation between word and meaning is addressed. Cf. *Vākyapadīya* 3.3.29 and 31 (s. Houben 1995: 158, 243f).

[v.24] Therefore, the nature of this that is signified by its suitability, is to be explained by separation, connection, and motion. What is the use of the other (imagined) motion and so on?

Therefore, the nature of this object that is signified by the term “suitability” (*yogyatā*), is to be explained by separation, connection, and motion, (i.e.) by the words “connection,” “separation,” and “motion.” Then what is the use of the other pointless motion and so on that are imagined (to be real)? None at all. In the expression “and so on” (the use) of connection, separation, otherness, non-otherness and other (relations imagined as real are included).

[v.25] **Because in case of these (entities), even if they existed, a relation in the form “of this” is not commonly accepted, this difference of natures is appropriate for (entities) that arise in each moment.**

Why (are they useless)? **Because in the case of these (entities), (i.e.) motion and so on, even if they existed, as imagined, a relation in the form “of this” is not commonly accepted.** Since, because through “dependence” (SP 1a) and so on relation of all kinds has been negated, a relation in the sense of “motion, connection and separation of this” is not established, why is there a designation based on them? Just as something is not related to another through motion and so on that are known in another (entity) because there is no relation, so also through the ones assumed. Since in this way there is no motion and so on due to a relation with motion and so on, thus **this difference of natures** as “is connected, is separate, moves” and so on **is appropriate for entities that arise in each moment** through ever new causes as the basis of uninterrupted production and so on, not for (entities) with a lasting and unitary nature because a relation such as connection is not established. Thus, there is in reality no relation defined as connection and so on. Therefore, the natures of all entities are without relation. Peace!

The Commentary on “Investigation of Relation” is completed. It is a composition by the teacher Devendrabuddhi. The manuscript is Krauddha<sup>2</sup>~anvita's.

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