

Inherited Opponents and New Opponents: A Look at Informal Argumentation in the *Tshad ma rigs gter**

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Abstract: This paper examines strategies of informal argumentation at play in the *Tshad ma rigs gter*, an epistemological work by the famous Tibetan Buddhist scholar Sa skya Paṇḍita. In particular, it considers Sa skya Paṇḍita's representation and criticism of two kinds of opponents: inherited opponents (whose views are already criticized in Indian Buddhist epistemological works) and new opponents who are part of the Tibetan cultural and intellectual context. This article distinguishes several strategical devices applied by the author when dealing with the second group, devices that include resort to ad personam arguments, the creation of a generic "Tibetan" opponent, and the comparison of these Tibetan views with those of inherited opponents. Also, this article discusses the pertinence of Sa skya Paṇḍita's arguments and their intended impact, and points out the need to distinguish the figure of the opponent as represented in a text from the actual addressee of an author's argument.

Key words: *Tshad ma rigs gter*, Sa skya Paṇḍita, Tibet, Buddhism, Epistemology, Informal argumentation, Argumentative strategy, Rhetoric

Introduction

While the theories of argumentation and debate developed in the Indian and Tibetan pre-modern contexts have received significant attention in modern scholarship, the practices of argumentation with hypothetical opponents that generally precede or supplement the author's own views.^① Patterns of argumentation applied in such cases go beyond the normalized arguments prescribed in works of argumentation theory of the author's own tradition, or even by the author himself. It is not rare to uncover logical flaws (common ones being *petitio principii* and the use of logical reasons that the opponent would not subscribe to) in seemingly well-formed arguments.

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① The question of applied argumentation in the context of face-to-face debate deserves a separate study involving a distinct methodology in view of the material available. Indeed, due to the lack of direct access to actual debating practices (other than the ones observable in modern times), those have to be studied *via* their representation — when not their *mise-en-scène* — in narratives found in various literary genres.

Furthermore, informal argumentation is also significantly present, for instance in the form of *ad hominem* or *tu quoque*. It is thus necessary to adopt an approach to applied argumentation that is not limited to the evaluation of conformity with some traditional theory, but takes in earnest the rhetorical dimension of arguments.

A specificity of textual argumentation is that the “opponent in the text” is primarily a literary creation of the author. Even when the depiction of his views takes for its basis a real opponent, who has existed or still exists, and has propounded the view under discussion, the “opponent in the text” does not have the autonomy an opponent in a debate has. In particular, the thesis that is ascribed to him, as well as any counterargument, concession, etc. he may offer in the text come through the hand of its author. The representation of the opponent and his views can thus be part of the author’s argumentative strategy.

A related issue is the question of the addressee of the argument. I use the term “addressee” to refer to the person(s) whom the author of the argument wishes to be stirred, and if possible convinced, by the argument. In a private discussion between two persons, the addressee of the argument is primarily the interlocutor.^① In a political debate in contrast the addressee is primarily the audience. In the context of a live philosophical debate, the opponent, the judge and the audience all qualify as addressees to various degrees. In textual argumentation, technically speaking the “opponent in the text” is the target of the argument. But who is the addressee? A real-life person who was the basis for the author’s presentation? Those who adhere to his views? Or are the arguments actually intended for the members of the author’s own creed? Or an “independent” readership? The question is especially meaningful when the real-life opponent and his adepts do not belong to the cultural environment of the author. This is notably the case with the various Indian non-Buddhist views attacked in Tibetan Buddhist treatises. One can thus anticipate that there will be a difference — if not formal, at least strategic — between, for example, an argument formulated by the seventh-century Indian Buddhist scholar Dharmakīrti against a Mīmāṃsaka, and the same argument occurring in a Tibetan Buddhist work from the time of the Later Diffusion of Buddhism.

With the above-mentioned considerations in mind, this article examines the case of the *Treasure of Reasoning* (*Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter*, hereafter *Rigs gter*), a work of Buddhist epistemology composed by the famous scholar Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182–1251). I will first identify the major opponents whose views are refuted in this work, and differentiate “inherited opponents”, who are already present in the fundamental Indian works that Sa paṇ takes as his basis, and “new opponents”, who are specific to Sa paṇ’s intellectual context. The latter turns out to be Sa paṇ’s chief target. Sa paṇ’s strategy to refute them involves the use of informal argumentation and rhetorical devices, whose potential impact and intended addressee I will examine.

① But not necessarily exclusively. The author of the argument may be willing to convince himself in the first place.

1. The *Rigs gter*

The *Rigs gter* hardly needs a presentation. Composed around 1219,^① it is the earliest of Sa paṅ's major works. This treatise presents itself as an explanation of the epistemological views of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, as they are exposed, respectively, in the former's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (hereafter: PS) and the latter's so-called collection of the seven treatises (*sde bdun*). In the facts, Sa paṅ's presentation relies mainly on Dharmakīrti.^② Among the seven treatises, the main source is the *Pramāṇavinīścaya* (hereafter: PVin), supplemented by the *Pramāṇavārttika* (hereafter: PV). In addition to the citation of individual verses from this last work, Sa paṅ includes longer excerpts on specific topics, such as concept formation (*apoha*) in the fourth chapter of the *Rigs gter*. Other works by Dharmakīrti are used selectively. Notably, the *Sambandhaparīkṣā* is quoted extensively in the chapter on relations (chap. 6) and the *Vādanyāya* in the chapter on debate (chap. 11).

Sa paṅ's exegetical project is combined with a polemical one, the target of which stands out clearly in the introductory verses:^③

In this snowy mountain range, thanks to the hundred millions of constellations of scholars
the lotus of the teachings of the Glorious [Dharma-]kīrti blossoms. Nevertheless,
insofar as these [scholars] are not pervaded by the sunrays of intelligence, they are unable
to throw light on the heart of its pistil, the intended meaning of the texts.

*gangs ri'i khrod 'dir mkhas pa'i rgyu skar bye ba brgyas // dpal ldan grags pa'i gsung rab
padmo kha phye (/rab phye) mod //*

*gang blo'i nyi 'od snang bas ma khyab de srid du // gzhung lugs dgongs don ge sar snying
po gsal ma nus //*

Sa paṅ is referring here to the Tibetan tradition of epistemology that flourishes in the early centuries of the Later Diffusion following the translation (or revision of previous translations), by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109), of Dharmakīrti's main works and selected commentaries, plus some independent treatises by Dharmakīrti's followers.^④ This tradition evolved in great part around the monastery of gSang phu Ne'u thog, to which many of the “great names” are

① See van der Kuijp 1983: 101 and 303, n. 293, and Jackson 1987: 64.

② Material from Dignāga's works is adduced exceptionally on topics not dealt with in detail by Dharmakīrti, such as, in the eleventh chapter of the *Rigs gter*, when discussing the Naiyāyika varieties of false rejoinders. Sa paṅ claims to rely on two works by Dignāga in this context — the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the *Nyāyaparīkṣā*, but cites exclusively from the first. See below n.32.

③ *Rigs gter*, p. 3 and 39. The reading of the root verses and that of the verses in the version with the auto-commentary slightly vary. Regarding the variant *kha phye* vs. *rab phye* Glo bo mkhan chen, who knows both readings, states that *kha phye* is preferable for the thematic unity of the flower-related terminology (*Rigs gter Nyi ma*, p. 8). Śākya mchog ldan combines both readings, using the expression *kha rab tu phye* (*Rigs gter Rol mtsho* 3a4) “they thoroughly opened the corolla of the lotus.”

The reading *de nyid du* for *de srid du* in the third line in the edition of the verses with the auto-commentary is a mistake. The text in the sDe dge edition on which the Lhasa edition is based reads *de srid du* (2a1).

④ For the details of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab's contribution, see Kramer 2007.

associated.^① rNgog Blo ldan shes rab himself, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169), his best disciples in the field, the “Eight Mighty Lions” — among whom gTsang nag pa brTson ’grus seng ge (?–after 1195) — and later authors such as Chu mig pa seng ge dpal (ca. 1210–1280). Without constituting a monolithic view, the positions of these scholars share a number of common points on key issues that can be considered the “trademarks” of this mainstream interpretative current.

In order to better situate Sa paṅ’s polemical project, it might be useful to recall some well-known elements of his biography.^② Sa paṅ’s first schooling in the field of epistemology was carried out under the direction of a scholar belonging to the gSang phu-related tradition:^③ mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge (ca. 1150–1210), who had been a student of Phya pa and gTsang nag pa. Later also Sa paṅ studied under rTsags/brTsegs dBang phyug seng ge and rMa bya rTsod pa’i seng ge, two of the “Eight Great Lions.”^④ He benefitted in addition from an alternative access to Indian epistemology through his studies with Śākyaśrībhadrā and the delegation of paṅḍits who accompanied him to Tibet, some of whom resided in Sa skya for several years. Sa paṅ’s studies with these paṅḍits turned into collaborative work as they proceeded to translate and revise texts together. In particular, Sa paṅ is credited with the revision of the translation of the PV. A switch of focus from the PVi to the PV is initiated in the *Rigs gter* and further carried out in the Sa skya tradition, starting with the PV commentary by Sa paṅ’s student ’U yug pa bSod nams seng ge (aka *Rigs pa’i seng ge*).

Some sources note that Sa paṅ started doubting Tibetan-style interpretations of Dharmakīrti already at the time of his studies with mTshur ston.^⑤ This is likely to be a biographer’s retroactive ascription. But it is conceivable that his studies with the Indian paṅḍits and direct access to the original texts in Sanskrit led him to reconsider some aspects of the Tibetan-style presentations he had studied earlier. Nevertheless, Sa paṅ’s final studies of epistemology took place again with a Tibetan teacher, B, tsegs Dbang phyug seng ge.^⑥ Thus in the facts, Sa paṅ did not turn his back on the Tibetan indigenous tradition of epistemology. A close examination of the *Rigs gter* reveals that he actually integrated in his own work much of his predecessors’ contribution, both in terms of the format of presentation and contents.^⑦ But on the surface, the

① For an introduction, see van der Kuijp 1989 and Hugon 2008.1: section 1.A.

② The major events of Sa paṅ’s life are dealt with in Jackson 1987: chap. 1.

③ Cf. van der Kuijp 1979: 408–409 and 1983: 99–101, and Jackson 1987: 25–27 and chap. 5.

④ mTshur ston is listed as one of the “Eight Great Lions” by Śākya mchog ldan in the *rNgog la bstan pa ji ltar bskyangs tshul*, p. 451, but is generally absent from this list.

⑤ Cf. Jackson 1987: 107 and 116, n. 16.

⑥ Cf. Jackson 1987: 111–112.

⑦ Śākya mchog ldan points out in *dGa’ byed* 13,5–6 that the *Rigs gter* combines Sa paṅ’s two sources for epistemology, the Tibetan one and the Indian one, positing directly the former when there is agreement between the two, refuting it when there is disagreement. Later (81,5–6) he states that even though it is said that Sa paṅ refuted all the Tibetan epitome-style presentation of epistemology (*bod kyi tshad bsdus ma lus pa bkag*), he actually took over most of his predecessors’ views relatively to the two kinds of inference and the theory of definition (which Śākya mchog ldan says was unknown in India in this form). The filiation with his predecessors is evident also in Sa paṅ’s re-use of large portions of texts from mTshur ston’s work (see Hugon 2008.1: 113–114 and my forthcoming “Text Re-use in Early Tibetan Epistemological Treatises,” in *Quotations, References and Re-use of Texts in Indian Philosophical Literature*, ed. by Elisa Freschi).

Rigs gter tells us a different story.

2. Two kinds of opponents in the *Rigs gter*

In spite of the focus of the introductory verse on those Tibetans who are unable to explain correctly Dharmakīrti's thought, these are not the only opponents Sa paṅ is dealing with in the *Rigs gter*. One of the closing verses gives us a more complete picture:^①

I have composed this great treatise that vanquishes the bad logic of the adepts of the Muni Kapila, Akṣapāda, Ulūka, the 'Space-clad' and 'those [who hold that] it is beautiful on this side,' of the Hearers, and of the expounders who reside in the snowy mountain range.

thub pa ser skya rkang mig pa dang 'ug pa 'i bu // mkha' gos can dang tshu rol mdzes pa 'i gzhung 'dzin pa //

thos sgrogs pa dang gangs ri 'i khrod gnas smra rnams kyi // rtog ge ngan 'joms bstan bcos chen po 'di byas so //

One can distinguish in this verse three categories of opponents among the seven that are mentioned:

- i) adherents of Indian non-Buddhist schools of thought: Sāṃkhya, Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika, Jaina^② and materialists (Cārvāka)^③;
- ii) Buddhists belonging to the otherwise so-called "Lesser Vehicle," here non-derogatorily referred to as Hearers (*thos sgrogs pa*, a synonym of *nyan thos*, Skt. *śrāvaka*);
- iii) Tibetan scholars.

These three categories can further be divided into two groups: members of (i) and (ii) are Indian opponents already refuted by Indian Buddhist authors; members of (iii) are Tibetan exegetes of Dharmakīrti's works.

2.1 Inherited opponents

I refer to the first group as "inherited opponents." They are indeed opponents who are

① *Rigs gter*, p. 36 and 369. The text on p. 369 mistakenly reads *bug pa 'i bu* for *'ug pa 'i bu*.

② The expression *nam mkha' gos can* is said in the *mKhas 'jug* ad 3.43 to be synonym with *phyogs kyi gos can*, as well as with *gcer bu pa* (Skt. *nagna* "naked medicants"), *'dzem med pa* (Skt. *nirgrantha* "those freed from hindrances"), *zad byed pa* (Skt. *kṣapaṇaka* "fasters"), *rgyal ba dam pa ba* ("followers of the ṛṣabha Jina"), *tshig gi don dgu pa* ("those who follow the nine categories"), and *srog gi sde tshan pa* (?*ājīvika*) (Jackson 1987: 274 and 345). According to Lokesh Chandra's dictionary, *nam mkha' i gos can*, *phyogs kyi gos* and *gcer bu pa* are used to render the Sanskrit Digambara.

③ In the *mKhas 'jug* ad 3.43 Sa paṅ lists as synonyms *tshu rol mdzes pa ba*, *'jig rten rgyang phan pa* (Skt. *lokāyata*), *tshad par lta ba pa* (Skt. *ucchedadr̥ṣṭika* "adherents of the theory of annihilation"), *med par smra ba pa* (Skt. *nāstika* "deniers, nihilists"), *phur bu pa* (Skt. *bārhaspatya* "followers of Bṛhaspati"), *ngo bo nyid rgyur smra ba pa* ("asserters that nature is the [only] cause") (Jackson 1987: 274–275 and 345). For further synonyms on this non-Buddhist school and the preceding one in the listings by Grags pa rgyal mtshan see van der Kuijp 1985: 83.

already dealt with in the Indian Buddhist corpus on which Sa paṅ relies. They thus find their way into the *Rigs gter* because they are a constitutive element of the source texts he is expounding.^① This “inheritance” took place in some cases via the medium of earlier Tibetan works who had already integrated these views.^②

i. Non-Buddhists

On the side of the non-Buddhists, Sa paṅ mentions in the verse cited above the Sāṃkhya, Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika, Jaina and Cārvāka systems. The Mīmāṃsā is not part of the list, even though its adherents appear as opponents in the body of the *Rigs gter* (*mu stegs dpyod pa ba/rgyal dpog pa*).^③ It is, on the other hand, present in the summarizing list of five non-Buddhist systems found in Sa paṅ’s *Entrance Gate for the Wise* (*mKhas ’jug* 3.43), a list from which the Nyāya is absent.^④ However, in the prose commentary on this verse, Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika, Aulūkyā and Kāṇāda, are said to be synonyms. This fivefold list in the *mKhas ’jug* is given as a summarized categorization of the “inconceivably many views” of the *mu stegs byed* which were already summarized in the *Tarkajavālā*.^⑤ Sa paṅ also uses the terms *mu stegs/mu stegs pa/mu stegs byed*, Tibetan translations of the Sanskrit *tīrthika* and the related term *tīrthyakara* to refer to Indian non-Buddhists in the *Rigs gter*.^⑥

① The majority of non-Buddhist views criticized in the *Rigs gter* can be traced to Dharmakīrti’s works. Sa paṅ further inherited opponents and views that are dealt with by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, some of which are posterior to Dharmakīrti. For instance the Jaina thinker Patrasvāmin (Tib. *snod kyi rje*), whose views are discussed in *Tattvasamgraha* 1363–1415 cum °*pañjikā*.

② Notably, some citations of the opponent’s views in the *Rigs gter* are already found in mTshur ston’s *sGron ma* (see n. 111). Another example is the position of the Jaina Patrasvāmin (see the preceding note), whose views are also already cited in *sGron ma*, and even earlier in Phya pa’s *Yid kyi mun sel*. A position attributed by Sa paṅ to Aviddhakarna (Tib. *rNa ma phug pa*) also is already cited in *sGron ma*, and earlier in Phya pa’s *’Od zer* and gTsang nag pa’s *bsDus pa*. I was unable in this case to find a parallel passage in the *Tattvasamgraha* or °*pañjika*, where Aviddhakarna’s views frequently come up.

③ Also found in the body of the text are arguments against partisans of the Veda in general (*rab byed*), and of theists (partisans of an eternal creator god) (*dbang phyug pa*).

④ Lists similar to that of the *mKhas ’jug* are found in Sa paṅ’s *Nga brgyad ma’i ’grel pa* and *Thug pa’i dgongs pa rab tu gsal ba* (cf. van der Kuijp 1985: 81).

⑤ Cf. Jackson 1987: 344. Sa paṅ speak of a list of 100 views found in the *Tarkajavālā*. This text mentions 363 views (D279a3: *lta ba sum brgya drug cu rtsa gsum po*), but actually enumerates only 120 names. On Glo bo mkhan chen’s discussion on the number of views distinguished in various sources, see Jackson 1987: 403, n. 105.

⑥ *Mu stegs can* for *tīrthika* and *mu stegs byed* for *tīrthyakara* are the translations prescribed in the *Mahāvīyutpatti* (MV 3514 and MV 3513) in chapter 179, whose title has the Tibetan equivalent *mu stegs pa*. For hypotheses as to the etymology of the Tibetan term, see Stein 1941. Stein (1983) notes that the Dunhuang manuscripts use the term *mur ’dug* (one could give as a literal translation “standing at the end”); he also notes the form *mu ’jug pa* (1983: 14). Stein links the translation *mur ’dug* with the so-called Chinese vocabulary, where it stands as the equivalent of *wai-tao* (*wàidào*; 外道), composed of the characters meaning “external” and “path (/teaching)” (*op. cit.*, p. 155). (My thanks to Marc Tiefenauer for pointing out this reference to me). If *mur ’dug* and *mu stegs* are originally two variant translations of the same Sanskrit term, in indigenous literature they are sometimes taken as representing two different kinds of opponents. For example, in the *Man ngag gi rgyal po lta ba’i phreng ba* attributed Padmasambhava, commented in the 11th c. by Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po, we find *mu stegs pa* and *mur thug pa* (likely an orthographic variant of *mur ’dug pa*) as the names of two categories of opponents, respectively eternalists and nihilists.

In Tibetan literature, the term *mu stegs* also applies to non-Buddhist systems that are not Indian. Stein (1983: 173) notes that the term is associated or assimilated to the Bon po in three manuscripts found in Dunhuang. The *dBa’ bzhed* designates pre-Buddhist practices and beliefs by the term *mu stegs kyi chos* (9b) and speaks also of Tibetan *mu stegs* (*bod kyi mu stegs*) and Chinese *mu stegs* (12a1 *rgya’i mu stegs*), in both cases non-Buddhists.

Glo bo mkhan chen comments on the term *mu stegs* in *gSal byed*, p. 302. He mentions the explanation of Slob dpon Shes rab go cha (Prajñāvarman) according to which *mu stegs* is “a path to heaven or liberation” (*spyir mu stegs zhes bya ba ni mtho ris dang thar pa’i lam ste*), and a *mu stegs byed* someone who composes a treatise about this topic. See below n. 118 for Bhāviveka’s definition of the term.

The above-mentioned Indian non-Buddhist systems did not spread to Tibet the way Buddhism did. Unlike Buddhist masters, Indian representative of these non-Buddhist views were not likely to be invited to Tibet at the time of the Later Diffusion, and had little reason to travel there for scholarly purpose. This raises the question of the degree of acquaintance Tibetan scholars may have had with such views, and of their very pertinence in the Tibetan context.

The relevant works of these non-Buddhist traditions were not fully translated into Tibetan. The portions that were translated are usually embedded in a Buddhist treatise, where they are cited to introduce an opponent's view (*pūrvapakṣa*).^① Tibetan scholars who traveled to India, Nepal or Kaśmīr, or studied or collaborated in Tibet with paṇḍits from these regions may have had the opportunity to expand their knowledge of non-Buddhist systems.^② But it does not appear that this promoted the scholarship regarding non-Buddhist views. We can observe in this regard that the sources relied on for the presentation of non-Buddhist views in early Tibetan doxographies are essentially Buddhist. For instance in his *Grub mtha' chen mo*, 'Chad kha ba Ye shes rdo rje (1101–1175) relies mainly on the *Tarkajvālā*.^③ Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) also lists the *Tarkajvālā* among the sources used for composing his doxography, along with Avalokitavratā's commentary on the *Prajñāpradīpa*, Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Kamalaśīla's *°pañjikā* and Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvātāra*.^④ Later doxographies tend to recycle material from earlier ones rather than rely on first-hand non-Buddhist sources. The portion dedicated to non-Buddhist systems is commonly extremely short in comparison with the presentation of Buddhist systems.

The colophon of Glo bo mkhan chen's *gSal byed*, a small work in which he presents in some detail the categories of opponents dealt with by Sa paṇ in the *Rigs gter* (whom he divides into the five categories listed in the concluding verses), states that his sources were Bhāviveka's *Tarkajvālā*, Kamalaśīla's *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṃkṣipta*, the “commentator Avalokitavratā” (*'grel byed spyan ras gzigs brtul zhugs*; which much refer to Avalokitavratā's commentary on the *Prajñāpradīpa*), Sa paṇ's *mKhas 'jug* and other sayings (*gsung sgros*), and the “*Dag ldan gsal byed* of Kun mkhyen rin chen dpal” which would have been a work by Lho pa kun mkhyen, a student of Sa paṇ.^⑤

① For instance Kumāriḥa's views are cited in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha*. In some cases, passages of non-Buddhist treatises were judged acceptable to the point of being cited by Buddhist authors in support of their own views. This is the case of the grammarian Bhartrhari, often cited for instance in Jñānaśrībhadrā's commentary on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (see Unebe 2000; Unebe counts 46 verses of the *Vākyapadīya* cited in this work), or simply taken over in Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīkṣā* (see Frauwallner 1959: 113–114; in this work, Dignāga re-uses a major portion of the third chapter of the *Vākyapadīya*).

② For instance Dmar ston records in the *Zhib mo rdo rje* that 'Brog mi addressed many inquiries about non-Buddhist philosophical tenets to Prajñākaramati at the time of his studies at Vikramaśīla (Stearns 2001: 87).

③ See Kapstein 2009: 141.

④ *bDe bar gshegs pa dang phyi rol pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa* 33b1–3.

⑤ Cf. *gSal byed*, p. 335. It is possible that Lho pa's *Dag ldan gsal byed* was an explanation of Grags pa rgyal mthan's commentary on the *Hevajratāntra* (in which he discusses non-Buddhist tenets, see below), which has the title *Dag ldan* (*B,tag pa gnyis pa'i rnam par bshad pa ma dag pa rnam's 'joms par byed pa'i rnam 'grel dag ldan*).

We can surmise that the Indian sources mentioned by these authors were also part of Sa paṅ's corpus but we unfortunately cannot draw information from the doxographical text included among Sa paṅ's collected works.^① Commentaries on the *Hevajratantra* by his uncle Grags pa rgyal mtshan, which include an exegesis of non-Buddhist tenets, also appear to have been a constitutive source for Sa paṅ.^② The *Rigs gter* reveals, in addition to the specific topic-related passages from Dharmakīrti's works and their commentaries, reliance on the *Tattvasamgraha* and °pañjikā and other Indian Buddhist works such as Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, from which Sa paṅ draws once in connection with a Sāṃkhya view.^③ But did Sa paṅ also draw from first-hand non-Buddhist sources? Sa paṅ had the opportunity to work with Indian paṅdits during about ten years, and we know from the biographies by his students that he did not study only Buddhist works with them. His formative studies indeed include works on Sanskrit grammar, lexicography, poetics, theater, etc. But there is no mention of non-Buddhist works that one could associate with the systems mentioned above, at the exception, possibly, of the *Nyāyasūtra*.^④

A potential source of information provided by his Indian teachers (orally, or less likely via the study of texts not listed by Sa paṅ's biographers) does not overtly transpire in the *Rigs gter*. One chapter which would deserve further research in this regard is the eleventh chapter, on proof, where Sa paṅ deals extensively with the Naiyāyika classification of points of defeat and 24 kinds of false rejoinders (Stk. *jāti*). But Sa paṅ himself tells us that his presentation of the false rejoinders is based on the two works of Dignāga, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the *Nyāyaparīkṣā* (*rigs pa brtag pa*),^⑤ without mentioning a Naiyāyika source.^⑥

When dealing with the result of valid cognition (*pramāṇaphala*) for perception in the ninth chapter, in the section devoted to adverse views, Sa paṅ deals successively with the Mīmāṃsaka, Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika, and ends with the Buddhist Vaibhāṣika.^⑦ For the three non-Buddhist views, Sa paṅ adduces a citation which does not already occur in Dharmakīrti's works or commentaries thereon. But this whole passage is an almost literal repeat of the discussion found in mTshur ston's *sGron ma*. And Mtshur ston himself repeats *quasi verbatim* the presentation found in Gtsang nag pa's *Bsdus pa* (at the exception of the refutation of each view, which is not found in *Bsdus pa*). Gtsang nag pa's source is probably not a first-hand one, at least for the verses adduced

① As discussed by Jackson (1985) and van der Kuijp (1985), the doxography originally composed by Sa paṅ, entitled *Grub mtha' rnam 'byed* or *Grub mtha'i dbye ba* is unfortunately lost, while the one included among his collected works, entitled *Gzhung lugs legs par bshad pa*, is a forgery.

② See van der Kuijp 1985, in particular p. 82–83.

③ Cf. *Rigs gter* 6, p. 131, where Sa paṅ cites *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9.129 (see n. 158).

④ The title *rig* [sic] *pa*, i.e., *Nyāya*, is listed in Lho pa kun mkhyen's biography of Sa paṅ among the works the latter studied, but Lho pa attributes it to Kaṇāda (see Jackson 1987: 109 and 119, n. 28). The same attribution of a text entitled *Rigs pa* to Kaṇāda is made by Glo bo mkhan chen in his *rtags rigs*, where he describes this text as a non-Buddhist work of logic (see Hugon 2002: 34).

⑤ There is no Tibetan translation of this work in the Tibetan canon. It is possible that the mention *rig pa* in Lho pa kun mkhyen's list (see the preceding note) refers to this work rather than to the *Nyāyasūtra*. In the given section, Sa paṅ provides many citations, all of which are identified as coming from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (referred to as *mdo*).

⑥ Cf. *Rigs gter* 11, p. 346 and 353.

⑦ See my introduction to the edition of *sGron ma*, p. xiii for detailed references on this passage.

for the Mīmāṃsā. These verses are indeed from the *Ślokaṅvārttika*, but they are also cited in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, which was more likely Gtsang nag pa's source.

Sa paṅ occasionally provides an identification of the non-Buddhist opponent not already given by Dharmakīrti's Indian commentators.^① But this does not in itself prove an extensive acquaintance with the original sources. And in one such case, it turns out that the identification is mistaken.^②

The refutation of non-Buddhist views constitutes a major part of Dharmakīrti's oeuvre. As Eltschinger has discussed,^③ the context which precedes the composition of Dharmakīrti's treatises is characterized by the rise of a Brahmanical orthodoxy hostile to Buddhism. Conjointly, the status of Buddhist institutions became precarious. This situation forced Buddhist scholars to create a new identity for themselves as "Buddhists". This involved a redeployment of the internal polemics towards the "outside". In contrast, Tibetan Buddhists — even though they had their own issues with non-Buddhists at the time of the Early Diffusion of Buddhism to Tibet in particular — were not directly threatened by the adherents of any of the above-listed non-Buddhist systems, or by Brahmanical orthodoxy. What was for Dharmakīrti a key-target thus loses its pertinence in Sa paṅ's context, at least as a social threat. The issue of the pertinence of Indian non-Buddhist tenets as an intellectual threat is more difficult to assess. Some themes that are at the heart of Dharmakīrti's polemic, such as the authority of the Vedas, their uncreated character, castes as natural categories, etc., must not have been of much concern for Tibetan Buddhists. On the other hand, the acceptance of non-momentary entities or of some type of personal identity were tenets still likely to find an echo even among Buddhist thinkers. This is not to say that Tibetan Buddhists would become adepts of the Mīmāṃsā or the Sāṃkhya *per se*. But some ideas found in these systems, but not specific to them, were still likely to surface — and did in fact surface — under the label of Buddhist interpretations.^④

ii. Buddhists

The second group of opponents mentioned by Sa paṅ is part of the internal front-line which prevails in Dharmakīrti's works in spite of the creation of what Eltschinger calls a "paradoxographic" identity.^⑤ "Hearers" (*śrāvaka*) are situated at the bottom of what has

① For an example see Hugon 2008.2: 538, n. 56.

② See Hugon 2008.2: 570, n. 115. Sa paṅ identifies as Vaiśeṣika the author of an objection, whereas the view he criticizes is rather to be linked with the Mīmāṃsā and can be traced to the *Mīmāṃsasūtra*.

③ Eltschinger 2007: 57–58.

④ Regarding other fields of influence of non-Buddhist traditions on Tibet, see the information provided by 'Chad kha ba Ye shes rdo rje in his *Grub mtha' chen mo*. In particular this author "maintains that the Indian myth of the cosmic egg, *Hiranyagarbha*, might be the source of a similar myth among the Tibetan Bon, and that some of the contested aspects of tantric practice among the Tibetans were due to the influence of the Mīmāṃsakas." (Kapstein 2009: 142). 'Chad kha ba thus wonders "whether this Bon might be a Vaiśeṣika textual tradition" and states that "This textual tradition of Mīmāṃsā is an exceedingly evil philosophical system that was of very great harm to Tibet" (transl. Kapstein 2009: 146). On the other hand, he reports that Vedānta and Sāṃkhya did not cause any harm in Tibet (*op. cit.*, p. 145).

⑤ Eltschinger 2007: 58.

been termed, in modern scholarship, Dharmakīrti's "ascending scale of analysis"^①. While the Sautrāntika system is adopted as a working model at the level where external reality is accepted, but is refuted on further analysis in favor of Buddhism idealism (*vijñānavāda*), the Vaibhāṣika system stands at the very bottom of the scale; it is not even acceptable as a provisional model. Note that neither model is identified nominally by Dharmakīrti, or linked with a specific author or text. This step is taken by commentators. A specific sect of the Vaibhāṣika is occasionally singled out: the Sāṃmitīya or Mahāsāṃmitīya. The Sāṃmitīya appear as a subgroup of the Vātsīputrīya. The latter are well known for their controversial adherence to *pudgalavāda*, the view that there is some kind of personal identity called "*pudgala*". This earns them strong criticism from those Buddhists who consider that accepting the *pudgala* amounts to subscribing to the existence of a Self. Some authors, such as Vasubandhu, are even reluctant to include the *pudgalavādins* among the "insiders" insofar as they profess a doctrine that cannot lead to liberation. The *pudgalavādins* are nevertheless categorized separately from those he calls *tīrthika*, a term commonly used in Indian Buddhist literature for all non-Buddhist systems.^② But they come dangerously close to being *tīrthika* themselves.^③ Candrakīrti also, in the *Madhyamakāvātāra*, labels the *pudgalavādins* (together with all *śrāvaka*) "outsiders" (*bāhya*). They are in his opinion "like *tīrthikas*" because they do not understand the meaning of the Teaching.^④ Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla speak of the Sāṃmitīya in terms of "endogenous *tīrthika*" (*nang gi mu stegs can*).^⑤ The same expression (in Sanskrit: *antaścāratīrthika*) occurs in Prajñākaramati's *pañjikā* on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* with regard to the same opponent. It appears to be used there metaphorically.^⑥ When commenting on the closing verse of the *Rigs gter*, Śākya mchog ldan qualifies the whole group of the Hearers as "endogenous *tīrthikas*".^⑦ We will have the opportunity to meet again with the Sāṃmitīya. We can note here that this

① To my knowledge, the first to start describing the arrangement of views in Dharmakīrti's works in these terms is Dreyfus (1997). Dunne (2004: 53ff) develops the idea, using the term "sliding scale of analysis" previously used by McClintock when discussing Śāntarakṣita's thought.

② In the *Prajñāpradīpa*, Bhāviveka explains *mu stegs byed* (*tīrthika* or *tīrthyakara*) etymologically as "Those who provide an entry to the fords (*jug ngogs*) external to the [Buddhist] Dharma" (D15b3: *gang dag chos kyi phyir 'jug ngogs su 'jug par byed pa dag*). He lists a number of examples, such as the followers of Brahmā, Viṣṇu or Śiva, disciples of Kapila, Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda, Vardhamāna, Jaimini. For a refutation of Burmouf's idea that the term *tīrthika* refers specifically to those who bathe on the banks of sacred rivers, see La Vallée Poussin 1898: 16, n. 3. See above n. 99 for Sa paṅ's use of the corresponding Tibetan term *mu stegs*.

③ See Vasubandhu's discussion of the *pudgalavāda* in the ninth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa*. He cites in this context a sūtra stating that those who adhere to such views become "undistinguishable from *tīrthikas*" (*nirviṣeṣo bhavati tīrthikaiḥ*) (see La Vallée Poussin 1971, vol. 5, 250–251).

④ *Madhyamakāvātāra* 6.86, mentioned and translated in La Vallée Poussin 1971, vol. 5, 228.

⑤ See respectively *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* on v. 89, D78a3: *ji ltar phyi dang nang gi mu stegs can rnams kyis...* and *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* D127b1: *nang gi mu stegs can rnams ni gang zag tu smra ba 'phags pa mang pos bkur ba rnams so*.

⑥ *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* ad 9.60, 455:16–18: *pudgalavādinā tu punar antaścāratīrthikāḥ / skandhebhyaḥ tattvānyatvābhyāṃ avācyam pudgalanāmānam ātmānam icchanti / anyathā tīrthikasiddhāntābhiniveśadarśanam syāt / Tib. D228b1–2: yang gang zag tu smra ba nang gi mu stegs can rnams kyis phung po rnams las de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du med pa 'i gang zag ba 'i bdag 'dod de / gzhan du na mu stegs can gyi grub mtha' la mngon par zhen pa 'i lta bar 'gyur ro /*

⑦ *Rigs gter rol mtsho* 148b1: *nang gi mu stegs su gyur ba 'i nyan thos pa...*

particular branch of the Vaibhāṣika appears to have been significantly presented in India around Dharmakīrti's time.^①

Sa paṅ presents us his version of the “scale of analysis” when establishing the Buddha's intention in the first chapter of the *Rigs gter*.^② He adds to external realism and idealism the model of “the absence of proliferations” as the highest view. On the level where external reality is accepted, Sa paṅ follows Dharmakīrti by adopting the Sautrāntika system and refuting the Vaibhāṣika view. The views of the Hearers, and in particular Vaibhāṣika views, are often mentioned as being identical with non-Buddhist views. For instance, both Vaiśeṣikas and Hearers accept that reality is made of atoms (*Rigs gter*, 1 p. 48 and 52; 7 p. 171); some *tīrthikas*, such as the Vaiśeṣikas, and some Hearers, such as Vaibhāṣikas, accept that all phenomena are substantially established (*Rigs gter* 4, p. 100); some *tīrthikas* and Vaibhāṣika do not accept reflexive awareness (*Rigs gter* 9, p. 234). Sāmmitīya views are also specifically discussed (see below 3.5.ii.1).

Sa paṅ's source concerning these opponents would require further research. The *Abhidharmakośa* was probably one of them.^③ We can note for now that in the case of the Sāmmitīya, the source of information transpiring from the relevant discussions appears to be primarily Dharmakīrti's presentation of these views, supplemented by the identification and information provided by Dharmakīrti's commentators.

2.2 New opponents

Tibetan scholars constitute a second category of opponents, one that is not inherited from Dharmakīrti's context, but is part of Sa paṅ's specific cultural and intellectual context. As I showed in section 1, the introductory verses place these opponents at the heart of Sa paṅ's polemical project. The “expounders who reside in the snowy mountain range” Sa paṅ is referring to in the closing verse cited at the beginning section 2 are not Tibetan thinkers in general, but more particularly epistemologists, epigones of Dharmakīrti. One of the closing verses occurring after the mention of the various opponents thus states:

I have composed this [treatise], having rejected the bad tradition of the elders^④
[who claim that] “this is the truth of the logic of the seven treatises” ;
Those who know the logic will accept it,
but this is no sphere of activity for the stupid, even if they hear it many times.

① See the statistics from Xuanzang's description in Eltschinger 2007: 53–54. Xuanzang mentions that Vārāṇasī and a nearby monastery of 1500 monks are essentially Sāmmitīya; so are the 3000 monks in the census concerning Viśākhā.

② *Rigs gter* 1, p. 48: *dgongs pa ngos bzung ba ni / thub pas phyi rol dpyod pa na rdul phran zhal gyis bzhes la / tha snyad kyi de kho na dpyod pa na sems tsam zhal gyis bzhes shing / don dam pa'i de kho na nyid la 'jug pa na spros pa dang bral ba la 'jug par mdzad do /*. This discussion occurs in the section where the nature of the apprehended object (*gzung yul*) is being examined.

③ The view ascribed to the Vaibhāṣika on the cognition of an object (*don rig*) in *Rigs gter* 1, p. 49 is analogous to *Abhidharmakośa* 1.42.

④ Both Glo bo mkhan chen and Śākya mchog ldan comment: “Tibetan elders” (*bod rgan po*).

sde bdun rigs pa 'i de nyid 'di yin zhes // rgan po 'i lugs ngan dor nas ngas 'di bshad //
rigs pa mkhyen pa de dag 'di bzhed mod // lan mang thos kyang blun po 'i spyod yul min //

These Tibetan scholars are not identified nominally by Sa paṅ himself, but the commentators provide more or less precise, and more or less reliable identifications.

In the *gSal byed* Glo bo mkhan chen divides Tibetan scholars into two categories: the previous ones (*snga rabs pa*) and the subsequent ones (*phyi rabs pa*).^① The latter are not named but described in somewhat cryptic terms that suggest some close enmity between them and Glo bo mkhan chen. Their views are not discussed in the *gSal byed*, however, as Glo bo mkhan chen judges that they are “not to the point and irrelevant” (*skabs su ma bab pa dang / ma 'brel ba*).^② For the former, Glo bo mkhan chen singles out, among others (*la sogs pa*), the names of Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (*chos kyi spyan ldan lo tsā ba chen po*), Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (*slob dpon cha pa*)^③ and Gtsang nag pa Bṛtson 'grus seng ge (*slob dpon gtsang nag pa*), and proceeds to give summaries of the positions of the first two.^④ The account in *gSal byed* is brief and could suggest a meager knowledge of the contribution of these early thinkers. However, Glo bo mkhan chen's commentary on the *Rigs gter* reveals more than a superficial acquaintance with the material. In particular, he obviously knew the work of Mtshur ston (Sa paṅ's first teacher of epistemology), which he identifies precisely on an occasion where it is cited *verbatim* by Sa paṅ.^⑤

The authors mentioned above are, as stated earlier, the “big names” of the early developments of Tibetan epistemology.^⑥ Since some epistemological works by these authors are now available, it has become possible to identify more precisely who are the opponents Sa paṅ is arguing against in the *Rigs gter* and to evaluate the reliability of the commentators'

① *gSal byed*, p. 332. Note that these expressions occur once each in the *Rigs gter*, but are to be linked with a different relative chronology than the one intended by Glo bo mkhan chen. In Sa paṅ's text, “previous” refers to a view identical with that of Phya pa, “subsequent” to a view attested in Gtsang nag pa and Mtshur ston's works. See Hugon 2008.1: 122.

② He adds that it is impossible to mention everything (*mtha' dag brjod par mi nus pa*), and that in some cases it would become a personal matter (lit. of desire and hatred; *skabs 'ga' zhig tu chags sdang du yang 'gyur ba 'i phyir ro*).

③ Commenting on the initial verses of the *Rigs gter*, Śākya mchog ldan singles out Phya pa and his *Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel*. But in the course of his commentary, he provides other names as well.

④ Glo bo mkhan chen cuts the presentation of Phya pa short and mentioning that one should consult the text(s) itself (/themselves) (*gSal byed*, p. 334: *de dag so so 'i nang tshan la brjod par bya ba mang du yod mod gzhung nyid kyi steng du dgag sgrub rgyas par bshad par bya 'o*). It is unclear whether he means the *Rigs gter* or Phya pa's texts. In the latter case, it would mean that he had (at least potentially) access to Phya pa's texts. The same question arises in the case of Gtsang nag pa, about whom he merely notes that there are several differences with the tenets of the others, and that the reader should understand them as before, i.e., by consulting the text itself. In the case of Rngog Blo ldan shes rab, he clearly refers the reader to Rngog Blo ldan shes rab's texts (*gSal byed*, p. 334: *rgyas par ni lo tsā ba 'i gzhung nyid du bla 'o*).

⑤ This is a passage where Sa paṅ presents the opponent's position in a discussion relative to the theory of definition. Glo bo mkhan chen corrects in this context the erroneous attribution to Gtsang nag pa made by Śākya mchog ldan. This was first discussed in van der Kuijp 1989: 22.

⑥ Contrary to Phya pa and Gtsang nag pa, Mtshur ston's name is not usually cited in the tradition, but this author has a special importance for our understanding of the formation of Sa paṅ's thought and the composition of the *Rigs gter*.

identifications.

The target of Sa paṅ's criticism when it comes to Tibetan opponents can roughly be divided into two categories: on the one hand, Sa paṅ is referring to tenets that we are now in the position to trace to a particular text. Mtshur ston's position, notably, is found in a form that is identifiably that of Mtshur ston's *Sgron ma*. Many positions that are dealt with in the eighth chapter of the *Rigs gter*, on definition, or in the tenth chapter, on inference, belong to this first category. On the other hand, there are views that appear to be a byproduct of the mainstream Gsang phu tradition, but are not attested (in form or content) in the works of its main figures (Rngog Blo ldan shes rab, Phya pa, Gtsang nag pa). Since the material from the early period available to us is far from being exhaustive, we cannot jump to the conclusion that such views are not linked with a particular author and text. But they would appear to constitute tendencies of interpretation shared by Sa paṅ's colleagues who "follow the tradition of the Epitome(s) (*bsdus pa*)," or of "Phya pa's Epitome(s)." ^① A number of positions attributed to the opponent in the fourth chapter, which deals with the theory of concept formation, thus have the form of general ideas and are not attested in the available material of authors anterior or contemporaneous to Sa paṅ. ^②

3. Informal argumentative strategies

The importance of the third group of opponents in Sa paṅ's polemical project has been pointed out before on the basis of the introductory and closing verses of the *Rigs gter*. Looking at the body of the text, they observably receive a special treatment also from the point of view of the register of argumentation that is applied. In this section, I will point out several instances of informal argumentation that are found specifically when Sa paṅ is dealing with Tibetan opponents. I consider them to be strategical devices in Sa paṅ's polemical project, devices that add to the straightforward refutation of these views by means of logical arguments. Their potential benefit will be discussed in section 4.

3.1 General depreciative remarks

One finds in the *Rigs gter* a number of derogatory statements relative to Tibetan opponents.

[a] The very introductory verses of the *Rigs gter* that I cited in section 1 target the opponent's mental capacities: Tibetan scholars are "not pervaded by the sunrays of intelligence" and thereby "unable to throw light on the intention of [Dharmakīrti's text]" .

[b] This line of depreciation is re-iterated in the closing verses, following the enumeration of the three groups of opponents. This verse clearly focuses on the third group, that of Tibetan exegetes. ^③

① For the expression *phyi bsdus*, see for instance *Dga' byed* 20a–21a cited and translated in van der Kuijp 1983: 110–115, and *passim*. Śākya mchog ldan also speaks in this text of *bsdus pa'i srol 'byed* and *tshad bsdus kyi srol...phye*. Glo bo mkhan chen speaks of the subsequent tradition of Tibetan epistemology in terms of *phyi rabs kyi bsdus pa smra ba rnams* (*Rigs gter Nyi ma*, p. 118).

② For instance in the fourth chapter (*Rigs gter* ad 45ab; Hugon 2008.2: 488–489): "Most of those who boast about being Tibetan logicians say that exclusion in the case of a non-entity is a non-entity, but exclusion in the case of an entity is an entity, because its nature is undifferentiated from the entity." In the present case, commentators do not provide any nominal identification.

③ *Rigs gter*, p. 369.

Even though they have some capacity of intelligence, they do not obtain the heart of the good explanation;

Even though they strive day and night, they do not arrive at the end of [even] a portion of the textual tradition;

Even though they accomplish meditative stabilization by constant effort, they deviate from the path that pleases the Buddha;

Even people who are satisfied in these degenerate times should think correctly and rely on the wise!

blo yi nus pa cung zad yod kyang legs bshad snying po ma rnyed cing //
nyin dang mtshan du 'bad pa byas kyang gzhung lugs phyogs re dpyis ma phyin //
rtag tu brtson pas ting 'dzin bsgrubs kyang sangs rgyas dgyes pa 'i lam las gol //
snyigs dus skye bo chog shes rnam kyang legs par soms la mkhas pa bsten //

When discussing the need for composing a commentary, Buddhist authors frequently argue that the composition is motivated by two facts: on the one hand, some people lack intelligence and thus necessitate additional explanation; on the other, there are bad teachers who need to be refuted. Here, Tibetan epistemologists are made to bear these two hats.

3.2 Critique of the opponent's exegetical capacities

While the previous passages exemplified a general despise for the opponent's intellect, many statements attack more precisely his exegetical competence. Insofar as the opponent claims to be an exegete of Dharmakīrti, the very quality of his exegesis can also be questioned in addition to the final view the opponent adopts. Hence in contrast to inherited opponents who were only attacked for their own views, the criticism towards Tibetan scholars also encompasses criticism of their views qua correct interpretations of Dharmakīrti's thought. Arguments showing that a certain position is “not the intention of the text” (*gzhung gi dgongs pa ma yin*) thus add to the claim of logical inconsistency (*rigs pas mi 'thad pa*; or “being incorrect upon examination” *brtags na mi 'thad pa*).

[a] The opponent is described as being confident in his capacities as a logician, whereas he is actually unable to understand the texts. Sa paṅ thus refers to Tibetan proponents as “those who boast of being logicians of the land of snow” (*Rigs gter* 4; Hugon 2008.2: 488: *kha ba can gyi rtog ge bar rlom pa phal che ba rnam*). In one of the closing verses (cited above in 2), they are described as “the bad tradition of the elders [who claim that] ‘this is the truth of the logic of the seven treatises’”.

[b] The very lack of acquaintance with and/or understanding of the materials (Dharmakīrti's works) is pointed out repeatedly by Sa paṅ: the opponent “simply does not know” or “simply does not understand” Dharmakīrti's thought.

For instance in the fourth chapter, a Tibetan opponent's position on the topic of ‘exclusion’ (*apoha*) — Dharmakīrti's theory of concept formation — is said to result from “mere

ignorance of the logical conventions” (*rtog ge'i tha snyad mi shes par zad*).^① In the tenth chapter, a Tibetan view on the object of inference is qualified of “mere ignorance of the object of valid cognition” (*tshad ma'i yul mi shes par zad do*); and further of “mere ignorance of the way exclusion of what is other, which is the heart of the secrets of logic, applies” (*rtog ge'i gsang tshig gi gnad gzhan sel gyi jug pa ma shes par zad*); the counterarguments reveal a “mere ignorance of [the theory of the] ‘exclusion of what is other’” (*gzhan sel ma mkhyen par zad*), and “mere ignorance of the presentation of the ‘exclusion of what is other’” (*gzhan sel gyi rnam gzhang ma mkhyen par zad*).^②

There are yet other points on which Tibetan opponents are said to reveal their ignorance. For instance in chapter 1 their lack of understanding of the distinction to be made between two kinds of valid cognition is pointed out.^③ In chapter 8, the Tibetan position on non-valid cognitions is described as “mere ignorance of [the notion of] ‘functioning by the force of reality’ (Skt. *vastubalapravṛtta*) and of the meaning of the texts”.^④

A few considerations can here be added in regard to the repeated accusation of ignorance pertaining to the ‘exclusion of what is other’ (*gzhan sel*, Tib. *anyāpoha*). This claim highlights, by contrast, Sa paṅ’s acquaintance with vast portions of Dharmakīrti’s thought expounded by the author in works other than the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* on which his predecessors focused. In particular, the theory of ‘exclusion’, which plays a major role in Dharmakīrti’s views on language and conceptual cognition and is expounded at length in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, is bizarrely absent in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, where it is merely hinted at in a couple verses.^⑤ It is then understandable that the topic is not dealt with extensively in the works of Sa paṅ’s predecessors that just comment on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. But the topic is also not addressed as such in their independent works that, even though they still focus on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, claim to present the whole of Dharmakīrti’s thought. Is it because these authors simply did not know this aspect of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy? Before jumping to conclusions, we should remember that the translation of the *Pramāṇavārttika* together with Prajñākara Gupta’s *°ālaṃkāra* was carried out by Rngog Blo ldan shes rab, who stood at the starting point of the developments of epistemology at Gsang phu monastery. Bibliographers further attribute to Rngog Blo ldan shes rab commentarial works not only on these two treatises, but also on Dharmottara’s and Śāṅkaranandana’s works on ‘exclusion’ (the *Anyāpohanāmaprakaraṇa* and the *Apoḥasiddhi*) which Rngog Blo ldan shes rab also translated. This topic was apparently of significant interest for Ngog Blo ldan shes rab, and I would think it likely that he also dealt with it in his teaching. It is thus difficult for me to admit that his successors would be largely ignorant about the topic. Still, we have to face the facts that

① *Rigs gter* 4, Hugon 2008.2: 422.

② See respectively *Rigs gter* 10; Hugon 2008.2: 636, 644, 656 and 658.

③ *Rigs gter* 1, p. 54: *kun tu tha snyad pa dang / pha rol gzigs pa'i tshad ma'i rnam gzhang mi shes par smra bar zad do //*

④ *Rigs gter* 8, p. 211: *dnogs po stobs zhugs dang gzhung gi dgongs pa ma shes par zad; dnogs po stobs kyis zhugs pa dang / slob dpon gyi dgongs pa ma shes par zad*. The reproach is repeated in chapter 9 when discussing the result of valid cognition. *Rigs gter* 9, p. 263: *de ni dnogs po stobs zhugs kyi rigs pa ma shes par zad*.

⑤ Namely, PVin 2.29–31 (=PV 1.40–42).

the works of his successors that are available so far display no evidence of an in-depth acquaintance with the subject, even though the relevant terminology is used and the basic model of the theory is integrated. ‘Exclusion’ is just not a topic of presentation, and the source discussions that would imply a reference to this theory is clearly limited to the few verses of the *Pramānaviniścaya* where the basic idea transpires.

[c] In the category of the criticism pertaining to exegetical capacities, we can add references to the Tibetans’ ignorance of the linguistic conventions in the field. For example Sa paṅ points out that the Tibetan illustration of the categories of subject and property (“impermanent sound” and “sound’s impermanence” respectively) discloses a “mere non-acquaintance with linguistic conventions, just like it is completely erring to teach the word ‘lake-born’ for a frog^①” .^②

[d] The reference to Tibetan opponents’ misdemeanors as interpreters becomes at times downright insulting. Sa paṅ concludes his argument against the Tibetan view that universals and exclusions (which, in Dharmakīrti’s system, take on the function of universals) are real by saying:^③

Thus, those who accept that exclusion and universal are real accept vindictively something that has been refuted by Dharmakīrti.

[Those who] refute the logic of this Great Being [Dharmakīrti]

while adopting the texts of Dharmakīrti,

[are like] monkeys living in the woods

who scatter filth on the forest’s trees.

*des na ldog pa dang spyi dngos por khas blangs pa des chos kyi grags pas gang bkag pa
de snying nad kyi khas blangs pa yin no //*

chos kyi grags pa ’i gzhung bzung nas // bdag nyid chen po ’i rigs pa ’gog //

nags la gnas pa ’i spre ’u dag // ljon pa ’i shing la mi gtsang ’thor //

[e] In the scope of animal-similes, one also finds a comparison of the view of Tibetan scholars on the knowledge of the three times with “the teaching on liberation of a turtle in a well, which is contradictory to both reasoning and scriptures.”^④ I do not know if this expression is a recurrent motive in Tibetan and/or Indian literature; it evokes for me the idea of a limited view of reality.

3.3 Criticism of inventions

① Even though the frog can be described as ‘born from the lake,’ the usage of the word ‘lake-born’ is restricted by convention to the lotus.

② *Rigs gter* 4, Hugon 2008.2: 468: *bod kha cig chos dang chos can brjod pa ’i dper brjod / rtog ge la grags pa ’i sgra ’i mi rtag pa dang / mi rtag pa ’i sgra la sogs pa la byed pa ni sgra ’i tha snyad la ma ’dris par zad de / mtsho skyes kyi sgra sbal pa la ’chad pa ltar rnam par ’khyams pa yin no //*

③ *Rigs gter* 4, Hugon 2008.2: 490.

④ *Rigs gter* 9, p. 240: *lung dang rigs pa dang ’gal ba khron ba ’i rus sbal gyi rnam par thar ba ston par zad do //*

As an extension of the “misunderstanding of the source texts”, some of the Tibetan views are criticized for having no grounding in these very texts. Thus for instance when discussing the Tibetan position on the faults that may affect the *definiens* in a definition, Sa paṅ says:^①

If these three faults are faults of the *definiens*, then why was this not said by the two crown-jewels of the wise [i.e., Dignāga and Dharmakīrti] in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the collection of the seven treatises? Therefore, these conventions are completely erring.
*skyon gsum po 'di mtshan nyid kyi skyon yin na mkhas ba 'i gtsug gi nor bu gnyis pos kun
 las btus dang sde bdun du ci 'i phyir mi gsung / des na tha snyad de dag rnam par
 'khyams pa yin no //*

Positions without an attested Indian source are “inventions” — a mark of individual creativity that is not regarded as something positive by Sa paṅ.^② In the same discussion, after presenting his own position, he concludes by saying:^③

Once one rejects the elegance of Dharmakīrti’s presentation and imagines on one’s own something that is not needed, this practice becomes erroneous. And even though it involves a portion of non-erroneous, since it is not familiar to the wise it is not pleasing, just like an etymological explanation made in a barbarian language.

*des na chos kyi grags pa 'i rnam gzhas bde ba bor nas rang nyid kyi mi dgos pa blos
 brtags nas sbyor ba 'di ni 'khrul par 'gyur la / cung zad ma 'khrul du zin yang / mkhas pa
 rnam la ma grags pas mi bde ste kla klo 'i skad kyi sgra 'chad pa bzhin no //*

3.4 Creation of a generic opponent

I have noted under point 2.2 that Sa paṅ does not identify his Tibetan opponents nominally. We cannot attribute this fact to ignorance, for Sa paṅ’s very teachers figure among the authors of the views quoted, at times literally. Rather, we can see this as part of a strategy to create a generic, undifferentiated opponent. The absence of distinction and of nominal identification contributes to this effect, together with the use of a generic appellation for Tibetan opponents: Sa paṅ calls them simply “the Tibetans” (*bod*, or some equivalent expression, such as *kha ba can pa*, or *gangs can pa*). This may appear surprising at first because, after all, Sa paṅ himself is a Tibetan! But this appellation means more, to my opinion, than an ethnic identification, which would also involve a differentiation of nationality between this group of opponents and the *tīrthika* and

① *Rigs gter* 8, p. 189.

② Sa paṅ does not use the term *rang bzo* in the *Rigs gter*. In the more religious-oriented field, newly invented (*rang bzo*) doctrines and invented texts are severely criticized by Sa paṅ for instance in the *Sdom gsum rab dbye* (part 3, v. 514; see Rhoton 2002: 321, and 163 for the translation), were they are assimilated to false teaching (*chos log*). “Self-invented conduct” (*rang bzo 'i rnam thar dpyod pa*) in the practice of tantra is also pointed out and criticized (v. 296; see Rhoton 2002: 310, and 135 for the translation). In the *Mkhas 'jug*, invented tenets are judged not to be worthy of debate (see below the discussion in section 4).

③ *Rigs gter* 8, p. 190–191.

śrāvaka opponents inherited from the Indian context. Sa paṅ's scholarly project, which he exposes fully in his *Mkhas 'jug*,^① indeed prescribes an India-oriented approach to Buddhism. This program involves not only the study of Sanskrit grammar and vocabulary to enable access to the texts in their original language, but also a thorough knowledge of the Indian context, modes of expression found in poetical works, etc.^② In this light, the use of the term “Tibetan” takes a derogatory connotation. It hints to the fact that Sa paṅ's opponents are “not indianized” enough. They do not have, or do not use, the tools necessary in Sa paṅ's opinion to guarantee a correct understanding of the source texts.

Generic appellations are also used in the *Rigs gter* for inherited opponents: *mu stegs byed/mu stegs* for non-Buddhist opponents, *nyan thos* (sometimes *nyan thos sde pa*) for the Buddhist ones. Still, references to members of these categories when their views come up for discussion regularly involve a more precise identification — with or without the mention of the generic appellation.^③ Nominal identification of an individual author in these categories is rare.^④ But for Tibetan opponents, it just never occurs. Sa paṅ does not go beyond a mere specification of relative chronology (previous/subsequent, as mentioned in 2.2), or restricting the scope of the target to “some” (*'ga' zhig*) of the Tibetans.

3.5 Comparison with the views of inherited opponents

Last but not least, a significant feature of Sa paṅ's informal argumentation against the “new opponents” is linked to his comparison of Tibetan views to the views of inherited opponents, both from the non-Buddhist and the Buddhist groups.

i. Comparison with non-Buddhist views

A significant number of cases where a connection is drawn by Sa paṅ between the positions of “the Tibetans” and that of Indian non-Buddhists pertains to Sāṃkhya views.^⑤ Said in passing, this gives Sa paṅ the opportunity of a play on words, as the views of the *gangs can pa* (“Tibetans”) are compared to those of the *grangs can pa* (“Sāṃkhya”). The views in question are notably:

① The *Mkhas 'jug* was, according to Jackson's conjecture (1987: 66), composed slightly after the *Rigs gter*, around 1220–1230.

② See Gold 2007.

③ For instance for non-Buddhists, the appellations *mu stegs spyod pa ba* (adepts of the Mīmāṃsā), *mu stegs bye brag pa* (of Vaiśeṣika), *mu stegs brda sprod pa ba* (grammairiens [Vaiyākaraṇa]); but also, without the prefix *mu stegs*: *bye brag pa*, *rig byed pa*, *rigs pa can*, *rgyal po pa*, etc. And for Buddhists: *nyan thos bye brag tu smra ba* (Vaibhāṣika), and *nyan thos sde pa mang pos bkur ba* (Sāṃmitīya/Mahāsāṃmitīya), or without the prefix *nyan thos*: *bye brag tu smra ba*, *mang pos bkur ba*.

④ To my knowledge, the only names given in the *Rigs gter* apart from the concluding verses are those of Bhartṛhari, the Naiyāyika Akṣapāda (*rkang mig*), Aviddhakarṇa (*rna ma phug pa*) and Vātsyāyana (*ba tsha'i bu*; see Jackson 1987: 376, n. 19), and the Jain Patrasvāmin (*snod kyi rje*).

⑤ Another comparison with unspecified *mu stegs byed* in general occurs in *Rigs gter* 6, p. 138, about the common acceptance of a specific type of connection (*'brel pa*) between an apprehended characterized phenomenon and a superimposed characterizing property (for instance between a stick and a stick-holder) (*mu stegs byed dang bod rnam's kha mthun par smra'o*). Dharmakīrti addresses this type of connection in PV 3.145=PVin 1.7. Tibetans and *tīrthikas* are brought together again in *Rigs gter* 11, p. 359 for adopting a definite number of points of defeat in debate. They differ as to how many there are, but are refuted together for adopting a definite number.

[a] The relation between the universal and its instances. In the third chapter, Sa paṇ discusses both the Tibetan and the Sāṃkhya views under the heading “refutation of the view that a unique universal is one (i.e., substantially identical)^① with many instances” (*spyi gcig bye brag du ma dang gcig pa dgag pa*). He presents both views separately (first the Sāṃkhya, then the Tibetan view)^② and concludes that “Sāṃkhya and Tibetans concord in accepting the preceding in these terms” (*'di skad 'dod pa 'i grangs can pa dang bod rnams don mthun no //*)^③.

[b] A follow-up on this discussion takes place in the sixth chapter. The issue is there the ontological status of the different properties that can be ascribed to an individual instance, and the relation between them. Sa paṇ himself adopts the view that these different properties *qua* exclusion — thereby termed *ldog pa* (Skt. *vyāvṛtti*) — are mental distinctions but do not exist in reality. The Sāṃkhya and some Tibetans (*bod 'ga' zhid*) are here connected with the common view that properties are substantially identical, and exist in the object/reality as distinct exclusions.^④ Sa paṇ makes a parallel here between properties *qua* exclusions such as “sound”, “produced”, “impermanent” distinguished with regard to a particular sound, and the three qualities (*guṇa*) of the Sāṃkhya system: *rajas*, *tamas* and *sattva*.^⑤ While in the previous passage these three were presented as instances of the universal, they are here assimilated to properties distinguished with regard to a unique thing, Nature (*pradhāna*), but accepted to exist in reality as this unique Nature. Sa paṇ concludes that the Tibetan and the Sāṃkhya positions are not distinct at all; it is just a matter of a different terminology.^⑥

① This section is indeed a subsection of the “refutation of the acceptance of [the universal and the instances] as being substantially identical” (*rdzas gcig tu 'dod pa dgag pa*).

② “The Sāṃkhya say that the universal called ‘Nature’ (*pradhāna*) consisting of the equilibrium of the three portions of passion (*rajas*), darkness (*tamas*) and goodness (*sattva*) exists in the particular instances, the pot, etc. that instantiate it, being substantially identical with them (*rdzas gcig*), just like fire and heat. And Tibetans unanimously [or: in agreement (with the former)] proclaim that a universal called ‘mere tree’ [in the sense of ‘unqualified tree’] exists in the particular instances such as śiṃśapā, sandalwood, etc., and the universal ‘mere blue’ in the particular instances such as blue beryl (*vaidurya*), etc., and similarly the universal called ‘mere cow’ [exists in the particular instances of cow] as one *qua* being an undistinguishable substance (*rdzas ngo bo dbyer med kyi gcig*).” (*Rigs gter* 3, p. 76: *grangs can ni rdul mun pa snying stobs gsum cha mnyam pa 'i gtso bo zhes bya ba 'i spyi de gsal ba bum pa la sogs pa 'i bye brag la me dang tsha ba ltar bdag gcig tu yod pas spyi dang bye brag rdzas gcig go zhes zer ro // yang bod rnams shing sha pa dang tsandan la sogs pa 'i bye brag la shing tsam zhes bya ba 'i spyi dang / vaidurya la sogs pa 'i sngon po 'i bye brag rnams la sngon po tsam zhes bya ba 'i spyi dang / de bzhin du ba lang tsam zhes bya ba 'i spyi rnams bye brag rnams la rdzas ngo bo dbyer med kyi gcig tu yod do zhes kha mthun par sgrog go //*). For additional details on the position attributed here to the Tibetans, see Hugon 2008.1: 252–256.

③ See also in the concluding verse of the chapter, the lines *rdzas gcig yin zhes grangs can pa // gangs can pa rnams de rjes 'brang //* (*Rigs gter* 3, p. 82).

④ “Sound, produced, and impermanent, these three are one substance, but exist in the object/reality itself as distinct exclusions. If exclusions were mind-made, proofs and refutations pertaining to reality would be impossible, because [as Dharmakīrti said] mental properties that are independent (*svatantra*) are not connected with reality.” (*Rigs gter* 6, p. 130: *grangs can dang bod 'ga' zhid kha mthun par sgra dang byas pa dang mi rtag pa gsum rdzas gcig kyang ldog pa tha dad du don nyid la gnas so // gal te ldog pa blos byas yin na don la dgag sgrub mi nus te / blo 'i chos rang dga' ba rnams don dang mi 'brel pa 'i phyir ro zhe na /*) The reference to Dharmakīrti can be traced to PVin 2 57,1–3 (=PVSV 3,1–3).

⑤ Sa paṇ relies here on a citation from the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (9.129) which mentions the term “quality” (*guṇa*). The preceding verse (9.128), not cited in the *Rigs gter*, specifies: *sattvaṃ rajas tamaś ceti guṇā[ḥ]*.

⑥ *Rigs gter* 6, p. 131: *grangs can gyi rang bzhin dang yon tan don gyi steng na bdag gcig par 'dod pa dang*

[c] A third passage where the two are brought together is found in the tenth chapter. Sa paṅ considers that Tibetans who distinguish two kinds of objects when inferring, namely substances and properties (*rdzas* and *ldog pa*),^① “like the Sāṃkhya, do not know the object of valid cognition.”^② It is possible that the comparison is made again with the Sāṃkhya’s theory of Nature and its three qualities. But it could also be a reference to the Sāṃkhya distinction between two kinds of inference, one that allows to infer the presence of the same particular that was previously ascertained to be connected with the logical reason (in the Sāṃkhya system, such particular is not impermanent), one that allows to infer the universal.^③

ii. Comparison with Buddhist views of the Hearers

The same process of linking the Tibetan view with the position of some inherited opponent takes place with regard to views ascribed to the Hearers, and more precisely to a special subgroup of the Vaibhāṣika, the Mahāsāṃmitīya.

ii.1 Comparison with Sāṃmitīya views

We have met before with this controversial school (section 2.1.ii), which some authors even hesitate to accept as genuinely Buddhist because of their admission of a type of personal identity in the form of the *pudgala*. Discussions involving the comparison of Tibetan and Sāṃmitīya views in the *Rigs gter* are not linked to this issue, but to the identification of what qualifies as an object of cognition (*yul*), and in particular what qualifies as the object of conceptual cognition and language.

[a] The first relevant passage occurs in the first chapter.^④ The comparison relies on the Tibetan threefold typology of ‘apprehended objects’ (*gzung yul*) or ‘appearing objects’ (*snang yul*), which matches three kinds of cognition: a particular is what appears to a non-erroneous non-conceptual cognition; a ‘manifest non-existent’ (i.e., something that does not exist in spite of its vivid appearance in cognition) to erroneous non-conceptual cognition; a concept (*don spyi*) appears to conceptual cognition, which is by nature erroneous.^⑤

For the Sāṃmitīya view, Sa paṅ draws from Dharmakīrti’s discussion of this position in PV

bod dag gis rdzas dang ldog pa don gyi steng na bdag gcig par 'dod pa ni ming bsgyur ba ma gtogs pa don la khyad par med do //

① On the meaning of these two terms in this context, see Hugon 2008.1: chap. D.

② *Rigs gter* ad 10.19a, Hugon 2008.2: 636: *des na grangs can pa ltar gangs can pas kyang tshad ma'i yul ma shes par zad do //*

③ See Hugon 2008.2: 686, n. 39.

④ *Rigs gter* 1, p. 40: *bod rnam's rtog pa 'khrul pa'i yul don spyi dang / rtog med 'khrul pa'i yul med pa gsal ba gnyis med na / 'khrul pa gzhi med du 'gyur bas snang yul gnyis yod la / de'ang 'khrul shes gnyis 'dzin pa'i rang rig gi shugs la grub bo zhes zer ba dang / nyan thos sde pa mang pos bkur ba la sogs pa sgra spyi dang don spyi gnyis ming dang mtshan ma'i rnam pa can gzugs dang sems dang sems las byung ba dang mi ldan pas ldan pa ma yin pa'i 'du byed rdzas su grub par 'dod la /* “Tibetans say: ‘If there was no object of erroneous conceptual cognition, the concept (*don spyi*), and there was no object of erroneous non-conceptual cognition, the ‘manifest non-existent,’ error would be without a basis; therefore these two appearing objects (*snang yul*) exist. This is also established by the force of the reflexive awareness that apprehends the two erroneous cognitions.’ And the *śrāvaka* Mahāsāṃmitīya, etc. accept that the generic term (*sgra spyi*) and generic object (*don spyi*) that have the aspect, respectively, of name and characteristic, are compositional factors not associated with matter, mind and the mental that are established as substances.” See also Hugon 2008.1: 153.

⑤ See Hugon 2008.1:142ff., and 147ff. on *don spyi*.

3.11cd–12ab, which his commentators attribute to the Sāṃmitīya.^① But in addition, Sa paṅ associates the Tibetan notion of *don spyi* and the connected notion of *sgra spyi* — the generic object and the generic word that are the *relata* when establishing and applying linguistic conventions^② — to the Sāṃmitīya notions of name and characteristic (*nāma* and *nimitta*), two non-associated compositional factors (*viprayuktasaṃskāra*) that are established in reality.

[b] The parallel established in the previous passage plays a role in a follow-up discussion on the object of words in the fifth chapter. Tibetans are (correctly) credited with the view that the object directly expressed by words (*dnegos kyi brjod bya*) is none other than the object of conceptual cognition, i.e., the *don spyi*. Sāṃmitīya are credited with the view that non-associated compositional factors of characteristic (*nimitta*) is what is expressed (*brjod bya*) when one sets conventions by means of the other non-associated compositional factor, the name (*nāma*).^③ Again, Sa paṅ states that these two views are identical (*don gcig pa*).

The key point of Sa paṅ’s criticism is that both systems admit that conceptual cognition, which is by nature an erroneous cognition, has an object. In his understanding, only the causally active particular qualifies as an ‘apprehended object’ (insofar as it causes the corresponding cognition). Hence, technically speaking, erroneous cognitions do not have an object, at least not an ‘apprehended object.’ In addition to this first mistake, the parallel with the Sāṃmitīya position further seems to imply that Tibetan thinkers accept a *don spyi* that is substantially established, like the Sāṃmitīya’s non-associated compositional factor.^④ This is not, however, a view that would be common to all of Sa paṅ’s predecessors. Phya pa for instance insists that the *don spyi* is not real (*dnegos med*). Under the global mention of “Tibetans” Sa paṅ may be targeting specific views on the *don spyi* that differ from that of Phya pa,^⑤ or is just taking advantage of the implication of the comparison.

ii.2 Comparison with the Vaibhāṣika in general

Comparison of Tibetan views with the Vaibhāṣika system in general occurs in the ninth

① See Hugon 2008.1: 153ff.

② Sa paṅ’s use of these notions has been dealt with in Ottmer 2003 and Gold 2005. For a summarized account of Sa paṅ’s understanding of these notions in comparison of their use by Phya pa see Hugon 2011. A more detailed analysis and hypotheses as to the origin of the terminology and its use in these texts will be provided in my forthcoming paper “What are Buddhist Epistemologists Talking About?” .

③ *Rigs gter* 5, p.119: ...*rtog pa'i yul don spyi nyid dnegos kyi brjod bya yin no zhes bod rnams 'dod la / mang pos bkur ba la sogs pa ni chos gang gzugs dang sems dang sems las byung ba dang mi ldan pa / ming zhes bya ba sgra dang don dang shes pa las tha dad pa bum pa dang snam bu la sogs par brda btags pa de dag mtshan ma zhes bya ba 'ang sgra dang don dang shes pa las tha dad pa don brjod pa'i rten du rung ba'i ldan pa ma yin pa'i 'du byed brjod bya yin no zhes zer ro //*. On this passage see Hugon 2008.1: 155.

④ This is confirmed in a passage where Sa paṅ has to answer objections vis-à-vis his own use of the notion of *don spyi*. He distinguishes his own position — that the *don spyi* is not established as a substance — from the view (recognizably that of his Tibetan opponents) that “the so-called *don spyi* is non-manifest, not causally efficient, and an established [factor] that is not associated with materiality, mind and the mental.” *Rigs gter* 5, p. 126: *don spyi zhes bya ba mi gsal la don byed mi nus pa / gzugs dang sems dang sems las byung ba dang mi ldan pa zhiḡ grub par 'dod na / mi ldan pa'i 'du byed la brjod pa'i skyon 'byung mod / kho bo cag gi don spyi rdzas su ma grub pas...*

⑤ See *Bsdus pa* 118a8–b1 for what could be a reference of the application of the notion of non-associated compositional factor to mental distinctions, and the discussion in Hugon 2008.1: 156.

chapter of the *Rigs gter* in the discussion on the result of valid cognition. After a short doxographical excursus, Sa paṅ asserts that Dharmakīrti adopts the Sautrāntika view on the level where one admits external reality, and the non-aspectualist idealist view on the level where one takes knowable objects to be not extra-mental but internal to the mind. Sa paṅ concludes that “We ourselves follow this method of Dharmakīrti. Most Tibetans follow the Vaibhāṣika; this is mere ignorance of reasoning that occurs by the force of facts.”^① In the doxographical excursus that precedes, the Vaibhāṣika view is characterized by the adoption of the view that the object of valid cognition and the valid cognition that cognizes it are distinct substances, but exist simultaneously,^② a view that is actually attested for instance in Phya pa’s works. The description of Sa paṅ’s predecessors’ position, and in particular that of Phya pa, as being “in accordance with the Vaibhāṣika system” is reiterated by Śākya mchog Idan.^③

The link between the two systems is here not artificial (as in the case of the Sāṃkhya) or potentially exaggerated (as in the case of the Sāṃmitīya). Indeed, there is evidence that at least part of Sa paṅ’s predecessors recognized themselves as “followers of the Vaibhāṣika system” at least to some degree.^④ Phya pa refutes in his doxographical discussions the idealist and Sautrāntika models, but does not make the explicit claim that he follows the Vaibhāṣika model. The author of the *Tshad bsdus*, who repeats Phya pa’s arguments, takes this step and states clearly that his own position “agrees with the *śrāvaka* Vaibhāṣika” .^⑤

Sa paṅ’s criticism of the Tibetans in this regard points out that the Vaibhāṣika view was refuted by Dharmakīrti himself. To adopt it is thus not only a double logical mistake (adopting an incorrect view and a self-contradictory one), but an exegetical one as well. While in the case of the theory of *apoha* (see 3.2) Sa paṅ may have been right in pointing out the opponent’s lack of knowledge of the source material, here we are dealing with a deliberate choice on the part of Sa paṅ’s predecessors. In Phya pa’s works, the adoption of the model we can call ‘quasi-Vaibhāṣika’ follows the refutation of the other models. Mtshur ston goes one step further and acknowledges without hesitation the difference between the adoption of this model and Dharmakīrti’s position.^⑥

① *Rigs gter* 9, p. 263: *kho bo cag kyang chos kyi grags pa ’i tshul ’di ’i rjes su ’brang ngo // bod phal cher bye brag tu smra ba ’i rjes su ’brang mod / de ni dngos po stobs zhugs kyi rigs pa ma shes par zad do //*

② *Rigs gter* 9, p. 262: *bye brag tu smra ba gzugs la sogs ba thugs phrad snang ba ’i don dngos gzhal bya / don mthong ba tshad ma / don rtogs mtshan nyid pa ’i tha snyad ’bras bur smra bas gzhal bya dang tshad ’bras gnyis rdzas tha dad dus mnyam par ’dod do //*

③ See the passage cited in van der Kuijp 1983: 63 and Jackson 1987: 170. See Hugon 2008.1: 156, n.67 for other references.

④ Sa paṅ actually acknowledges that the match is partial. In the first chapter for instance, he distinguishes the Vaibhāṣika position on the cognition of an object (*don rig*) from that ascribed to the Tibetans. Sa paṅ’s account of the Tibetan position accurately represent the views, for instance, of Phya pa, which differ from the view ascribed to the Vaibhāṣika in this context (cf. Hugon 2008.1: 157).

⑤ *Tshad bsdus* 5,6: *nyan thos bye brag tu smra ba dang mthun par.*

⑥ See *Sgron ma* 30a7–b1. The last part is cited and translated in Hugon 2008.1: 159–159. The doxographical presentations in *Rigs gter* and *Sgron ma* are almost identical. However, Mtshur ston ascribes to Dharmakīrti the adoption of the aspectualist Sautrāntika view when dealing with the cognition of an object (*don rig*), and of the mistaken-aspectualist (*rnam brdzun pa*) view in the context of idealism, whereas according to Sa paṅ, Dharmakīrti adopts the non-aspectualist (*rnam med*) view in this context. Mtshur ston argues that since these two views have already been shown to be incorrect in his text (the argumentation is similar to that found in Phya pa’s works), one should adopt in the conventional context of the view of the non-aspectualist cognition of an object (*don rig rnam med*), which he describes in the same terms as the first model on the list, which Sa paṅ explicitly identifies as the Vaibhāṣika view in the parallel passage of the *Rigs gter*.

4. Characterization and intended impact

The cases considered in the previous section amply demonstrate that Sa paṅ's use of argumentation is not bound to the strict application of logical patterns following the prescribed model of inference. The *Rigs gter* displays a range of informal argumentative tools deployed in particular against Tibetan competitors. Needless to say, it is difficult to evaluate the possible impact of the *Rigs gter* argumentation, and in particular of its informal features, on the readership — either on the Tibetan thinkers whose views are criticized, or on Sa paṅ's disciples. We know that the *Rigs gter* did not gain an immediate success, and for sure did not put an end to the mainstream interpretative tradition Sa paṅ criticizes, even though some scholars in this tradition may have been receptive to some aspects of Sa paṅ's arguments.^①

All the instances dealt with in section 3 can be to some degree categorized in the category of *ad hominem* arguments. Arguments of this type are adduced to imply that the views of a person are wrong because of a feature attached to the person herself rather than her views. They are typically meant to influence the audience or readership by discrediting the author of the views being examined. *Ad hominem* arguments are not logically valid, but they can be more or less pertinent. Lack of intelligence for instance, stands out as a pertinent claim when aiming to refute the soundness of someone's philosophical views, whereas lack of hair or money would not qualify as pertinent in this case. Also, the *ad personam* claim, whether pertinent or not, can be more or less well-founded. The beauty of *ad hominem* arguments is that they can still be effective on the audience even if the *ad personam* claim is unfounded and/or not pertinent. It may bring additional advantages in a debate, for instance, by leading the opponent to lose his temper, or to be side-tracked on proving that the *ad personam* accusation is unsubstantiated rather than concentrating on defending the thesis under discussion.

Sa paṅ's criticism of Tibetan epistemologists implies a discredit of the opponent at several levels: Tibetan opponents are presented as being stupid, ignorant, bad exegetes, and as I will show below, bad Buddhists as well.

The *ad personam* claim of “lack of intelligence” (3.1) qualifies as pertinent, but Sa paṅ does not to my opinion make this claim in earnest. Indeed, we must remember that his own teachers of epistemology are among the Tibetan opponents he thus attacks. It would not be proper that he accuses them literally of ignorance. The claim has to be taken for its rhetorical value.

Things are different when it comes to the implication that Tibetans are “bad exegetes of Dharmakīrti”. Ignorance of the source texts and disagreement with the source texts are claims that can be warranted, at least to some extent (indeed, many passages leave room for various interpretations). But the very pertinence of the argument depends on the weight one wants to give to faithfulness to a tradition, possibly against the philosophical soundness of a particular view. In

① I think for instance that some of the positions adopted by Chu mig pa Seng ge dpal that contrast with the earlier Gsang phu tradition as represented in Gtsang nag pa might have been influenced by Sa paṅ's criticism. But confirmation of this fact must await further study. Whether or not this was indeed the case, we may note that Chu mig pa does not mention Sa paṅ as a source of influence, and does not either discuss explicitly any of Sa Pan's criticism against the views characteristic of Gsang phu-related authors.

this regard, Sa paṅ displays (at least on the surface) an attitude towards the Indian tradition that one can label ‘fundamentalist’. The Indian corpus plays the role of the touchstone for independent presentations, support to be adduced for one’s interpretation, and argument to reject the interpretation of others as unfounded or unfaithful to an author’s intention. In Sa paṅ’s perspective, if unintentional disagreement with Dharmakīrti’s text is a sign of ignorance, intentional disagreement is a crime of lese-majesty. It is true that his predecessors also position themselves as exegetes of Dharmakīrti and introduce their treatises as expositions of Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s systems. As such, they are likely to be liable to the accusation of contradiction with the very treatises they are expounding. Nevertheless, it appears that some of these authors have their own agenda. They do not hesitate to innovate and transform Dharmakīrti’s system and some of them even dare claiming openly their disagreement on some issues. Thus the accusations of “disagreement with the source text” or “holding a view that has no source in the Indian corpus” lose some of their pertinence when one steps out of Sa paṅ’s own epistemological project. Still, it is to be noted that Sa paṅ’s predecessors themselves occasionally resort to the claim of “contradiction with the source text” to refute their own opponents. Thus it is likely that they would recognize this kind of argument as a strong argument, one that demands to be answered, either by contesting the interpretation of the adduced source, or by presenting reasons for departing from the source text on this point.

By creating a generic Tibetan opponent, Sa paṅ stages an opponent representative of an homogeneous tradition. This allows him to address Tibetan views *en bloc* without dealing with each author’s specifics: a generic argument for a generic opponent. If this strategy is certainly economic, and acceptable for the readership composed of Sa paṅ’s students, it is on the other hand less likely to have an impact on the “real opponents”, who may not (be willing to) recognize themselves in Sa paṅ’s customized generic opponent. For Sa paṅ, the grouping of all Tibetan epistemologists under the same label can bring another advantage: it sets Sa paṅ apart from the whole of the previous and contemporaneous tradition. Even though in the facts Sa paṅ counts among its heirs, it is now his connection with India that is emphasized in contrast to the not-enough-indianized Tibetans.

The method consisting in drawing a parallel between Tibetan views and the views of inherited opponents is advantageous on several levels. One is purely practical: the same argument can be used to refute both categories of opponents. In addition to being able to hit two birds with one stone, Sa paṅ additionally has a stone ready at his disposal, because together with the inherited opponents, he also inherits arguments against them.

Further, the bridging of Tibetan views with that of inherited opponents highlights the internal contradiction for the Tibetan opponent *qua* exegete, as he is adopting a view identical or similar to a view that has been refuted by Dharmakīrti. As discussed above, this claim of contradiction can be fent off or may be considered non-pertinent by the opponent, but it remains likely to have an effect on a readership supportive of Sa paṅ’s ideals.

We have seen that in some cases the induced similarity is most probably not the

consequence of an established historical or intellectual influence. The artificial parallel between of the two can possibly be shown to be philosophically substantiated through a detailed analysis of the respective models. But in such a case the opponent might argue further, contesting the alleged similarity. Other parallels drawn by Sa paṅ, in particular in the comparison with Vaibhāṣika, would on the other hand have been acknowledged by the opponent himself. Can we still speak here of an informal argumentative strategy?^① I would argue that even when the similarity is an established fact, there is a rhetorical dimension to the argument that must be taken into account, even though we cannot demonstrate that it was part of the author's primary intention. Advantages of the rhetorical dimension in such arguments come from the presentation of the opponent as sharing tenets with other opponents who are well-known to the readership to have been already refuted. The argument itself, which can be re-used, has already proven effective. Hence the opponent's view is discredited from the start, and the argument used to refute him is not likely to be contested. In the *Rigs gter*, these comparisons take yet an additional rhetorical dimension in view of the religio-philosophical affiliation of the comparand. Comparison with the Sāṃkhya straight out asserts that Tibetan scholars adopt views that are not Buddhist. Like in any *ad hominem* argument, that claim is likely to have an impact even if it is not warranted or involves a misrepresentation of one of the two views. Even though Tibetan opponents probably did not get their ideas from Sāṃkhya works, and would not likely make the claim of an affiliation with the Sāṃkhya, they are presented to the reader as being “like *tīrthikas*”.

When Tibetan views are compared to the Vaibhāṣika system, the comparand is Buddhist. But the association may be negatively connoted for an audience who subscribes to Sa paṅ's and Dharmakīrti's ascending scale of analysis, which places Vaibhāṣika at the lowest level. The impact is likely to be broader in the more specific analogy with the Sāṃmitīya. As mentioned in section 2.1.ii, the very affiliation of this sect to the category “Buddhist” is debated in the tradition. The controversial point is of course their adoption of the *pudgala* and not their specific views on the object of conceptual cognition. Still, the very mention of this school's name is likely

① A similar question was raised in articles dealing with Sa paṅ's criticism, in the *Thub pa'i dgongs pa rab tu gsal ba*, of Bka' bgyud pa doctrines termed the “white panacea” (*dkar po chig thub*) via a link with the quietist teaching of Hva shang Mahāyāna, who was refuted by Kamalaśīla at the occasion of the Bsams yas debate. While R. Jackson (1982) argued that Sa paṅ is using “history as polemic,” van der Kuijp (1986) pointed out that Sa paṅ's argument may actually be substantiated by the existence of a historical filiation of the “white panacea”-doctrine with the Chinese views. Van der Kuijp criticizes Jackson for his attempt “to show that Sa paṅ, perhaps wilfully, employed ‘history as polemic’ in order to criticise the ‘white panacea’ of his immediate predecessors (and contemporaries) and that, moreover, he ...was the first Tibetan scholar to ‘use’ Hva shang Mahāyāna in this way, and ... perhaps the most egregious...” (*op. cit.*, p. 147). Van der Kuijp concludes from his comparison of Sa paṅ's text with a work by the rNying ma pa scholar Nyang ral nyi ma 'od zer (1124–1192 or 1136–1204) that “Sa paṅ was simply transmitting a received tradition and that he was by no means its originator” (*op. cit.*, p. 150). He also presents evidence that “would seem to indicate that the association of *dkar po chig thub* with the Chinese goes back to pre-*phyi dar* Tibetan literature, and that there just might be some substance to Sa paṅ's linkage of some of the Dwags po Bka' bgyud-pa doctrines with those promulgated by the Chinese in eighth century Tibet.” (*op. cit.*, p. 151).

to trigger an association with a category of opponents which departs from Buddhist orthodoxy to the point of being considered “outsiders” by some Buddhist thinkers. Similarity with the *Sāṃmitīya* thus threatens the very endogenous status of Tibetan Buddhist thinkers.

We may also relate the issue of the implied connection of the opponent with these Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems to Sa paṅ’s discussion of “worthy opponents in a debate” in the *Mkhas ’jug*. According to this text, there are only two kinds of philosophical tenets worth discussing: Buddhists (*sangs rgyas pa*) and non-Buddhist (*mu stegs pa*). Even if an opponent does not want to initially claim any affiliation, his take on the issue at hand will enable one to subsume him under one of the two.^① Tenets that do not fall within the scope of these two are “new philosophical tenets,” “fabricated by ignorant persons,” “empty of reasoning [and] in contradiction with the scriptures” , “upheld as their own by fools out of desire and hatred” and “originate from no authentic source” .^② Those can be ignored by learned people unless they spread to the point of threatening to harm the doctrine of the Buddha. Sa paṅ specifically links the category of “foolish tenets” to views promulgated in Tibet.^③

In this light, we may distinguish three options for Tibetan epistemologists to be considered “opponents worthy of discussion” in the *Rigs gter*: (i) they recognize that the tenets under discussion are those of an established Buddhist school; (ii) they recognize that they are equivalent to those of an established non-Buddhist system; (iii) they take full responsibility for holding innovating or idiosyncratic views. In such a case, according to Sa paṅ’s categorization, their tenets qualify as “foolish tenets” and the only reason they may be considered in the *Rigs gter* would be that they must be refuted because they are spreading to the point of constituting a menace for the Buddhist doctrine.

To sum up, Tibetan opponents are pictured as deficient scholars, mediocre exegetes, and eventually flawed Buddhists. We find these three aspects regrouped in one of the concluding verses we have mentioned under 3.2 [b]:

Even though they have some capacity of intelligence, they do not obtain the heart of the good explanation;

Even though they strive day and night, they do not arrive at the end of [even] a portion of the textual tradition;

Even though they accomplish meditative stabilization by constant effort, they deviate from the path that pleases the Buddha.

① See *Mkhas ’jug* 3.36–39; Jackson 1987: 341–342.

② *Mkhas ’jug* 3.41 with auto-commentary; transl. in Jackson 1987: 343.

③ *Mkhas ’jug* 3.42: “Here in the Land of Snows there also exist many tenets of fools that are different from [Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian sectarian tenets]. Because fools can easily understand [those], learned men have usually ignored them.” (transl. in Jackson 1987: 344).

Conclusion

In guise of conclusion, I would like to examine the question of the addressee of Sa paṅ's arguments. The identification of the addressee may be tricky when one considers arguments in texts. As discussed in the introduction, the opponent himself is in such a case a construction of the author, the "opponent in the text". While arguments are directed at the views of the "opponent in the text", he does not qualify as the addressee. When the "opponent in the text" is a reflection of an existing opponent, one option is that the addressee is precisely this person. Thus, in the case of Sa paṅ's arguments against Tibetan opponents, we may identify among potential addressees existing Tibetan scholars and their followers, or the followers of previous Tibetan scholars, who subscribe to the views being criticized. Sa paṅ's own students also certainly figure among the addressees. Not because they need to be refuted, but rather because they need to be shown what are the views they should not adopt and why.

But who is the addressee of arguments against inherited opponents? For Dharmakīrti, the addressee certainly included live opponents, adepts of these systems, who as Eltschinger has showed were wide-spread and active in this days.^① But in the case of Sa paṅ, there is no corresponding live opponent in the Tibetan world. Still, it is worth noting that Sa paṅ does not consider inherited opponents to be mere "ghost-opponents". Indeed, his discussion on debate in the *Mkhas 'jug* shows that he deemed them to be serious potential opponents in a live debate and not mere relicts of Indian lore.^② If it is one thing to train Tibetan scholars to be ready for a potential encounter with Indian *tīrthikas*, I deem it quite unlikely that Sa paṅ would have expected any Indian *tīrthika* masters to read his treatise.^③ The addressee of the argument is therefore to be found among Sa paṅ's readership: a Tibetan Buddhist audience. Sa paṅ's arguments against inherited opponents are thus not aimed at the original partisans who were among Dharmakīrti's addressees and their successors and adepts in India, but they demonstrate to

① See n. 114 and 124.

② See *Mkhas 'jug* 3.41, where Sa paṅ states that there are two kinds of philosophical tenets adhered to by learned men, and worthy of refutation by a learned person: Buddhist and non-Buddhist (referring to Indian non-Buddhist systems). Later in the chapter, he gives instruction pertaining to debate with the respective opponents. The question of the extent to which the potential non-Buddhist opponents were live opponents for Tibetan scholars would deserve further research. There were clearly opportunities to debate with *tīrthikas* for Tibetans who traveled to Nepal, Kaśmīr or India, or to witness debates opposing Buddhists and non-Buddhists. See for instance in 'Gos lo tsā ba's *Deb ther sngon po* the account of the debate witnessed by Lha rje Zla ba'i 'od zer (1123–?) as he was studying with Jayasena in Nepal (p. 285–286); of the victory of Jo bo se btsun on a non-Buddhist master (*phyi rol pa'i a tsa ra*) in Nepal (p. 308); or the victory of La stod dmar against some *tīrthikas* on the banks of the Ganges (p. 1198). This last victory is related to be carried out through magic (*rdzu 'phrul*). Debate with a *tīrthika* that has for consequence the death of the Buddhist by poisoning seems to be a recurrent motive. Such a story is found for instance in relation to Sa paṅ's uncle Kun dga' 'bar (according to the notes added to Dmar ston's *Zhib mo rdo rje*; see Stearns 2001: 155 and 257, n. 249), and to Rgya B, tson seng (according to the biography of Atiśa by Mchims Nam mkha' grags; see Vitali 2004: 14).

③ I do not believe that one can take at face value biographical accounts that mention Sa paṅ's reputation in the whole of India and/or the existence of a Sanskrit translation of the whole *Rigs gter* (although a translation of the verse of invocation is conceivable). Rhoton (2002: 15) reports that Rin spungs pa Ngag dbang 'jigs med grags pa (1542–1625?) states that the *Rigs gter* was translated into Sanskrit by students of Śākyaśrībhadrā. Amipa (1987: 59) states in his biography of Sa paṅ that the latter translated the *Rigs gter* in Sanskrit himself.

Tibetan scholars the pitfalls of borrowing any element from such views. These pitfalls are largely a matter of logic or philosophical coherence. However, in passages where Sa paṅ affirms that his predecessors actually adopted these views, we could in addition discern a concern that Sa paṅ had himself, and conceivably wanted his readership to take into account, namely that wrong interpretations of the Indian corpus and the adoption of erroneous tenets, even in the field of epistemology, were likely to hurt the preservation of the Buddhist *dharma* in Tibet.

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Abbreviations

ATBS	Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien – Universität Wien
BEFEO	Bulletin de l’Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient
JIABS	Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy
VÖAW	Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
WSTB	Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde

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- PV Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*. Ed. Y. Miyasaka in *Acta Indologica* 2, 1972. I adopt the following order for the chapters: 1. *anumāna*; 2. *pramāṇasiddhi*; 3. *pratyakṣa*; 4. *parārthānumāna*.
- PVin Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. PVin 1: in *Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, I. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam*, ed. and transl. by Tilmann Vetter. Vienna, 1966: VÖAW. PVin 2: in *Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ. Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I. Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte, Teil II. Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, ed. by Ernst Steinkellner. Vienna, 1973: VÖAW (VKSKS 15).
- PVSV Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika* chap. 1 and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. Ed. by R. Gnoli in *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*, Rome, 1960: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma 23).

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